3. UREN THEN VOLUNTEERED THAT HE THOUGHT THE HAWKE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE LESS LIKELY TO SPEAK ON OUR BEHALF TO THE CHINESE ABOUT
HONG KONG THAT ITS PREDECESSOR. HAWKE WOULD PROBABLY NEED TO BE CONVINCED THAT THERE WAS A GOOD AUSTRALIAN REASON FOR DOING SO.
I ASKED WHETHER HE COULD NOT BE CONVINCED OF THIS.
UREN WAS UNSURE. HE SAID THAT EVEN THE FRASER GOVERNMENT HAS INSTRU- CTED ITS DIPLOMATS TO AVOID GETTING IN A POSITION WHERE THEY WERE CARRYING MESSAGES BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND THE CHINESE.
I TOLD UREN THAT MY OWN FEELING WAS THAT THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN THEIR CARRYING SUCH MESSAGES. HOWEVER, IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THERE WAS AN AUSTRALIAN INTEREST IN HONG KONG AND IF THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WERE TO GIVE THEIR OWN VIEWS TO THE CHINESE THIS MIGHT HELP TO REMIND THE CHINESE THAT THERE WAS INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN THE MATTER. IF THEY COULD TELL THE CHINESE A THING OR TWO ABOUT CAPITALISM, SO MUCH THE BET- TER. BUT IT WAS FOR THE AUSTRALIANS THEMSELVES TO DECIDE WHETHER TO SPEAK TO ZHAO IN APRIL AND, IF SO, WHAT TO SAY. UREN SUGGESTED THAT IF THIS WERE SAID AT SENIOR DIPLOMATIC LEVEL IN LONDON OR CANBERRA IT MIGHT. BE BETTER RECEIVED BY THE AUSTRALIANS THATN A REQUEST TO PUT ACROSS A SPECIFIC LINE OF ARGUMENT.
4. UREN SAID HE HAD HEARD FROM A WELL-CONNECTED CHINESE SOURCES THAT ZHAO XINGZHI, A VICE MAYOR IN SHANGHAI, AN EX-AMBASSADOR TO AN AFRICAN COUNTRY WITH GOOD MFA AND PARTY CONNECTIONS, WOULD SUCCEED WANG KUANG IN HONG KONG.
5. WE AGREED THAT THIS CONVERSATION SHOULD BE TREATED IN THE
STRICTEST CONFIDENCE.
SIGNED..
.RN PEIRCE