CRS 300
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENMAL
FROM PEKING 0802352 FEB 8C
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
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TELEGRAM NUNDER 129 OF 6/2/83
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никоко 15
1 O FEB 1983
HEPEATED FOR INFO TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG: PRIORITY WASHINGTON
SAVING TO TOKYO SEOUL
SHULTZ VISIT.
1. I CALLED ON MY US COLLEAGUE ON 7 FEBRUARY FOR HIS IMPRESSIONS OF THIS VISIT. HUMMEL WAS REASONABLY PLEASED WITH THE OUTCOME, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE FACT THAT, AS HE SAW IT,
SHULTZ HAD TO COME VIRTUALLY EMPTY-HANDED. THE SINO-US DIALOGUE HAD BEEN RESUMED. THE CHINESE OBVIOUSLY ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, WERE DETERMINED NOT TO QUARRLE, AND HAD MANAGED TO LIFT THEIR SIGHTS ABOVE ROUTINE COMPLAINTS. SHULTZ HAD GONE DOWN WELL. BUT THE CHINESE WERE BOTH DEMANDING AND VAGUE. THEY HAD LAID GREAT STRESS ON THE RESTORATION OF ''MUTUAL TRUST BETWEEN CHINA AND AMERICA ASA PRECONDIMON
FOR
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS. THEY SEEMED TO EXPECT EXCEPTIONALLY FAVOUR- ABLE TREATMENT FROM THE US, NOT JUST OVER ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN, BUT IN OTHER NOT CLEARLY SPECIFIED AREAS BEFORE BEING WILLING TO ACCEPT THAT THEIR CONDITION WAS MET. SHULTZ HAD BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO RAISE UNREALISTIC EXCEPTIONS.
2. REFERENCES TO TAIWAN HAD BEEN COMPARATIVELY BRIEF, THE AMERICANS SAYING THAT THEY WOULD ABIDE BY THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE 17 AUGUST COMMUNIQUE, THE CHINESE SAYING THAT THEY WOULD SE WATCHING CLOSELY TO SEE THAT THIS WAS DONE.
3. ON TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, THE CHINESE, AS EXPECTED, EXPRESSED MUCH DISSATIFACTION AND PROBABLY STILL FAILED TO UNDERSTAND, PARTICULARLY AT SENIOR LEVEL, HOW THE US COULD NOT GIVE THEM THE SPECIAL TREATMENT THEY WERE SEEKING, THE AMERICANS WOULD TRY TO LIBERALISE, BUT IT WAS NOT EASY AND FRICTION WAS LIKELY TO CONTINUE HERE.
4.
ON NUCLEAR COOPEARATIN, THE US POSITION HAD SEEN EXPLAINED AND A US SUGGESTION MADE THAT THERE SHOULD DE A MEETING TO DRAW UP AN AGREEMENT. BUT THE US WOULD HAVE TO INSIST ON SAFEGUARDS WHICH CHINA WAS UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT AND ALTHOUGH HUMMEL WOULD LIKE TO SEE US PARTICIPATION IN THE GUANGDONG NUCLEAR PROJECT HE
AS NOT AT ALL SANCUINE.
See
CONFIDEN MAL
15.
38)