CODE 18.77
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Mr Hoare
Mr
CONFIDENTIAL
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It is untersting to see that Mr. Lewis to work for the HKG Infonetin series drept.
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- 7 FEB 198
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THE 'PROSPECTS FOR HONG KONG': A STUDY BY THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CONFLICT
1.
The attached Study tells us little, if anything, that we did not know before but it is, in my view, well written, carefully researched and generally sensible. We learned some months ago that it was being produced and I got the impression then that the Hong Kong Government
including the Hong Kong Government Office here were expecting it to be a rather poor and unhelpful piece of work which I do not believe it is.
2.
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Of particular interest to us is the final chapter from page 19 onwards. Some of the ideas expressed on pages 21 to 24 about a possible settlement are probably over-optimistic, although in a number of respects they are not all that different from some of our own ideas! Mr Lewis, to the following conclusions:
(a)
(b)
(c)
Commer
if we are to cede sovereignty we must first be assured of agreed arrangements for the future;
the nub of the problem is administration, and to whom administration should be answerable;
answerability to Peking is more likely than answerability to London;
(d)
but
before we agree to this, the head of the Hong Kong administration would have to be assured of similar powers and discretion to those enjoyed by the present Governor and that Britain, as a right, would be entitled to advise and communicate with the Hong Kong administration.
Mr Lewis' finds it hard to imagine that China would find it difficult to come to such an arrangement, which would largely meet China's requirements while being convenient to Britain and supportive to Hong Kong.
3.
One other point of interest is the idea, towards the end of page 21, that Britain and China could reach early agreement on a joint declaration of. intent covering a number of years following 1997, which would facilitate an extension of property leases in the New Territories for perhaps 10 years without prejudice to the final outcome of the negotiations.
CONFIDENTIAL
/4.