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Dependent Territories
15 APRIL 1983
must concentrate the minds of Government and Parliament only the formal constitutional arrangements between us and our colonies but on what the defence relationship is supposed to be. Perhaps this motion will help that. I do not endorse the view which some people may hold, that there should be an automatic commitment to defend all those territories to the death in the distant future, but we must settle our obligations towards those countries.
A few months ago, I listened to a speech about defence by a distinguished Australian academic. He did not mention the United Kingdom once. That represents a transformation in attitude. Once upon a time Australia was dependent on the United Kingdom, whereas it is now adopting a defence policy in which the United Kingdom figures as a superfluous element.
I refer the House to an excellent memorandum that was submitted to the Select Committee on Defence by three academics from Southampton university-Drs. Calvert and Simpson and Mr. Frank Gregory. They pointed out the need to consider the remainder of our dependencies and colonies from the point of view of defence. That causes major problems. In the past 20 years, we have shed our imperial responsibilities and concentrated on NATO. Since the Falklands dispute, we have encouraged those people who believe that perhaps we should not have given up empire but remained a military force in far-of places.
Although I strongly agree that we should have continued with decolonisation, I do not believe, as many of my colleagues might, that we have no defence obligations outside NATO. I can conceive circumstances in the future-I regret that there might be some— -when we might have to go outside our formal military responsibilities. That stance in no way endorses the concept of a rapid deployment force that charges around the world when someone twitches our beard or moustache. However, I do not subscribe to the opposite view, that there are no circumstances in which we should deploy our forces outside NATO.
I viewed the sending of the task force to the Falkland Islands with some misgivings and scepticism, but not on the same grounds as some of my colleagues, which was that we had no moral right to defend British territory. My objection was simply that, having examined the risks, and the forces that were available to us and the formidable forces that could be arrayed against us, I concluded that the risks were too great for the rewards. I have not altered my view. It was, as someone said, a political war to save political face.
Having been to the Falklands and examined the defences and studied the issue seriously, I hope that we can reach some form of accommodation with a civilian regime in Argentina. However, I am not so naive as to assume that one has only to sling out the military and in will come a civilian regime which will be willing to negotiate. I am not confident of our diplomatic service out there, in the light of what happened leading up to the invasion. Nor am I convinced of the quality of intelligence-gathering-I hope that it has improved. Nevertheless, we determine whether what party leaders in Argentina are saying is political rhetoric to outbid each other in the election or whether it genuinely represents the leadership's view that in no circumstances will there be any compromise with the United Kingdom in negotiations on the Falkland Islands.
must
I am worried that we have dug a big hole for ourselves in the Falkland Islands. Now that we have emerged with
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limited casualties and loss of equipment, we should not assume that, having whipped the Argentines once we can do so again on any future occasion when they decide to stick their noses anywhere near the Falkland Islands. Anyone who has the intelligence and willingness to analyse Argentine military and political developments can see that they have embarked on a massive shopping expedition. They have acquired arms from Israel, the United States and Germany indirectly through the United Kingdom. They have substantially, and remarkably swiftly, repaired the damage to their armed forces and morale. The time will come- -it may be in one year or two-when the Argentines will have reached the stage at which they were before their unsuccessful invasion of the Falkland Islands. From then on, the risk to us will be proportionately greater because, whatever forces are available to us, we can afford to deploy only a small proportion of them in the south Atlantic. We have only a limited number of submarines, so we cannot deploy even a small percentage of them there indefinitely. The Navy is being reduced to 40 or 50-ship fleet, and we cannot afford to have about one quarter of it tied down indefinitely in the Falkland Islands.
If we wish to stick it out and to say to Argentina, "Regardless of your views, the interests of the islanders will be paramount for ever," we must accept that it will be enormously costly in terms of scarce resources that could be better deployed for the defence of the United Kingdom in the NATO area. It will be expensive in terms of money that could be saved for other areas of public expenditure under strain, and will cost us greatly in our relations with our allies and with other countries in South America. It is the height of folly to assume that the present" position can obtain indefinitely.
I do not subscribe to the view that, having retained the islands and shown our commitment, we should now fade away. We must have adequate defence of the Falkland Islands during the period leading to genuine negotiations. The negotiations should not be conducted from a position of absolute weakness. To many Argentines, negotiations are simply a time frame during which we shall acquiesce to their demands, but negotiations should not take that form. We must negotiate from strength, although not incredible strength, because we cannot afford it. We must determine the defence expenditure and commitment that will be sufficient to deter future aggression. The old policy of the trip wire was exposed ruthlessly and humiliatingly a year ago. In the not too distant future we must try to return to genuine negotiations with Argentina so that we can secure the long-term future of the islands, taking into account the wishes of the islanders, and perhaps considering a United Nations solution or some of the solutions that were under consideration while the task force was en route to the islands.
The alternative to that approach is the risk of further conflict, and next time we may not be so fortunate. We have been learning our lessons, but we can be certain that the Argentines have also learnt some lessons.
The Select Committee on Defence today published report on British forces in Hong Kong. It does not discuss the vexed question of future constitutional relations with China, but considers our defence contribution to Hong Kong. I hope that the report will be read carefully, because we must bear it in mind that the cost of maintaining a force in Hong Kong is much less than we imagine. About 75 per