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[Mr. Dalyell]
Dependent Territories
15 APRIL 1983
possible for the Prime Minister to know exactly what were the orders to the Belgrano and her escorts to return to port on Sunday 2 May 1982, before she gave the order to Conqueror to fire the torpedoes.
I shall not recapitulate my speech of 21 December outlining the litany of untruth that has been given in explanation of the sinking of the Belgrano, or my speech of 24 March when all other politicians were, understandably, looking to Darlington-charging the Prime Minister with war crimes and misdemeanours. Ministers have hurled at me abuse of various kinds, but abuse from the Dispatch Box is no substitute for a factual
answer.
Today I content myself with adding this to my charge that the radio messages were intercepted and that the codes were broken. Writing in the February issue of International Defense Review—a heavyweigt American publication Dr. Juan Carlos Murguizur, lecturer in military history at the Argentine army staff college, said:
“Setting aside the indisputable advantage provided by satellite reconnaissance, the British intercepted all our radio trans- missions, and almost certainly broke our codes. This may well explain why General Menendez's (easily locatable) HQ was never attacked, since its destruction would have deprived the enemy of its source of detailed knowledge of the orders promulgated to our troops, their requirements, how they were deployed and the composition of each unit."
That is written in a serious, heavyweight American journal and would seem to bear out yet again what I said on 24 March, in column 1112 of Hansard, about the Nimrods with their twin Marconi AD 470 HF transceivers.
What I said about MI6 in column 1107 would also seem to be borne out by Dr. Murguizur. He said:
"But a further factor, which has received very little attention, considerably hampered our air operations the British received instant warning whenever our aircraft took off, not only by reconnaissance satellite, but also by visual observation transmitted to them by their spies inside Argentina. A warning time of one hour allowed the British ships to steam far enough east to be out of range of our aircraft. They began using this tactic after being caught napping by our first attacks at the beginning of May."
The truth is that the Prime Minister-incidentally, keeping most of her Cabinet well away from the direction of the war-knew very well that the Belgrano had been told to withdraw by Inaya, and that peace, involving the withdrawal of all forces, British and Argentine, was there for the asking. Instead, she insisted on military victory for domestic political reasons, and I hold her personally responsible for the death of all those young men, and personally culpable for the second Malvinas war, which will break out sooner or later if we do not negotiate about sovereignty.
Galtieri is now in goal and I am not in the least sad about that, but I ask for a factual comment on the following question and answers attributed to an interview with Galtieri on 11 August 1982, and published in Clarin on 2 April 1983. The question that was put to the former Argentine president was:
“Did you at any time contemplate a meeting between yourself and Mrs. Thatcher?"
The answer from Galtieri was:
“At various times Presidents Belaunde Terry of Peru and Turbay Ayala of Columbia offered to act as intermediaries between the two of us. We also considered the possibility of a meeting in Mexico or Switzerland, but the answer always came
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back from London that it would be inappropriate. Then approximately a fortnight before the fall of Puerto Argentino, Mrs. Thatcher broke off completely."
Is that true?
Part of the precondition for a “just war" is that leaders do everything possible to avoid the spilling of blood and the pursuit of fighting. By that criterion-the Falklands war was not a just war - I believe that the Prime Minister should have met Galtieri. She should take to heart the comment of Jayne, the daughter of Ernie Vickers- killed in the engine room of the Atlantic Conveyor— made in the house of Joe Booth, the Falkland Islands Company's chief electrician:
"Was it worth it? Rather my father went like this than dying of cancer', said Jayne. ‘But I would not say it was worth it~ because it should have been avoided.' Joe Booth, their islander host eight years older than Ernie, put in vehemently: 'Yes, it should have been avoided diplomatically"".
It is against that background that I ask whether there was a refusal to meet in Mexico or Switzerland, and I ask for a factual answer. Was the offer of a meeting at any time reported to the House of Commons? I do not think that it
was.
The whole tragedy was truly avoidable, in that the Prime Minister knew by the first week in March, when, according to the Franks report, in paragraphs 147 to 152, she was in her own handwriting notating on the dispatch from Ambassador Williams in Buenos Aires:
"We must have contingency plans". Prime Ministers who ask for military contingency plans cannot say that the crisis came out of the blue 26 days later. I now believe that the Prime Minister knew in February 1982 of the likelihood of fighting in the Falklands. I have been told by various sources-unquotable because, for understandable reasons, they were not prepared to supoort in public what they told me in private—that the SAS, based mostly in Hereford, was warned in February 1982 that it would be fighting in the Falklands.
Now the cat of the supporting evidence has been let out of the bag. In the Sunday Standard, on page 3, Margaret Vaughan-whom I knew some years on Radio Forth, and subsequently on the Daily Record, as an extremely accurate journalist-riveted my attention with a passage in her article headed
"Tears on the SS Pilgrimage"
about Corporal Robert Allan Burns, ex-Royal Corps of Signals, late of the SAS, who tragically lost his life on 19 May when his Sea King helicopter hit an albatross and fell into the water.
Margaret Vaughan wrote:
"Last February, on his last leave home, Allan confided to his father that he expected to be involved in an overseas conflict. In his customary manner, he didn't reveal his intended destination. But he gave a clue which was to become the code word in his final telegram to the family."
Before leaving Dundee he wrote:
"Remember we once visited Falkland Palace, dad?" and his leave ended in February 1982. His sister and other people in Dundee confirm that. The telegram that the family received from Allan before he headed for the Falklands told them where he was going. It read:
"Hope you're all fine. I'm off to the Palace."
That was an artless, chatty article, not at all geared to political conspiracy or military controversy, but accurate. It has been checked with the family and with people in Dundee. It was February, and it reveals that 22-year-old Corporal Robert Allan Burns knew in February that he was going to be fighting in the Falklands, more than likely