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immigrants and consequently subject to the liability to deportation, we think it is necessary to define a time-limit which would remove the liability from persons resident in the Colony or Protectorate for more than a specified period.
We think that power of deportation might be taken with regard to British subjects falling within the following classes :-—
A. Persons found within a limited period after their arrival to be persons whose entry into the Colony or Protectorate was contrary to the immigration law but who did not intentionally contravene that law.
B. Persons convicted within a limited period of their arrival of an offence punishable with imprisonment without the option of a fine; and persons who, although not so punishable, have wilfully entered the territory in contravention of the immigration law.
C. Persons found within a limited period of their arrival to be persons whose continued presence in the territory concerned is a menace to peace, order and good government, or to public morals.
D. Persons found within a limited period of their arrival to be likely for reasons of bodily or mental health or for other reasons to become a charge upon public funds.
It may in some cases be desirable to provide for the repatriation of the wife and dependent children of a person ordered to be deported, and the circum- stances of each case should be examined by the executive. We do not think that an order for deportation should be made in respect of the wife and children, but if their removal is found to be desirable, we think that the Government must be prepared to pay the cost.
6. Before considering how we should propose to determine the limited period of time suggested for each of the above classes of persons we think it will be convenient to deal with the question of procedure. In this respect there is. a variety of rules in force and practices followed in different Dependencies. It would be a waste of time to enumerate or analyse the exact position in all these territories, but a few examples may be of use. In Gibraltar the Governor may order any person to quit Gibraltar whom he may judge undesirable to be therein, and if any person refuses to obey such order, the Governor may cause him to be arrested and to be removed from Gibraltar. We recognize that the circumstances of Gibraltar, which is primarily a fortress, are of a very special character and may justify very special legal provisions, and we should therefore deprecate the provisions of the Gibraltar Order in Council being regarded as an example to be followed elsewhere. In the Bahamas, if within five years after the arrival of any immigrant not being a returning native of the Colony, it shall come to the notice of the Immigration Officer that such immigrant is undesirable, the Immi- gration Officer may, with the approval of the Governor-in-Council, order such immigrant to leave the Colony. In Barbados, if it appears to the Governor that it is expedient for the preservation of the peace and order of the Island that any person, other than a British subject who is domiciled in the Island or who through- out the preceding two years has been resident in the Island, shall be required to leave it, the Governor may make an order requiring such person to leave the Island within a certain specified time. In Bermuda, if within five years after the arrival of any passenger not being a returning native of Bermuda the Immi- gration Board is of opinion that such passenger is undesirable, the Board may order such passenger to leave the Colony. The Seychelles Ordinance No. 8 of 1932 (notice of non-disallowance of which has not yet been given) gives the Governor power to make an Order requiring any person (other than a native of Seychelles, who is a British subject) to leave and remain out of Seychelles. The principal points to which we desire to draw attention are that in some cases the power of ordering deportation is vested in a comparatively subordinate officer, or in an authority such as an Immigration Board, and that there is no regular rule that orders for deportation shall only follow some kind of quasi- judicial enquiry. We think that certain principles of universal application can properly be laid down. To begin with we suggest that the actual order of deporta- tion should not, in any case, be made by any authority other than the Governor-in- Council, or, if there is no Executive Council, the Governor. Secondly, we consider that such an order should, in all cases, be preceded by a judicial enquiry or judicial proceedings. Turning to the classification given above of persons.
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