this has so far had no visible deterrent effect. Hong Kong therefore faces the prospect of a steady rise in the hard core of unresettled cases and another dramatic rise next summer in the refugee population as the S W monsoon again attracts them to the territory'
b) As I explained, HMG have been careful so far to avoid issuing any firm policy commitment to accept residual ship rescues landed in first asylum states even in respect of UK registered shipping. We handle each case ad hoc. DOT therefore insisted when we discussed the Poyang this summer that we could not offer Hong Kong shipping a more generous policy than we were prepared to offer our own. I suggest we make it clear in para 3(b) of the draft that we are recommending an agreement to take the residuals from the Poyang (and also possibly the Hupeh in Manila, which as you know is a slightly different case which we are already pursuing spearately) as a single gesture to Hong Kong without prejudice to our existing policy
Con the grounds that leaving this old case 'on the file' is
damaging Hong Kong's ability to press other flag states to take off their residuals on time. (Obviosuly if rescues by Hong Kong shipping occur once or twice again they will have, now that the option of our quota is no longer available, to get to grips with the problem of settling the residuals. But no one likes making policy in this area, and I think we are still better off solving problems on a case by case basis. A concession on the Poyang may of course be seen as something of a precedent and will increase the pressure on any subsequent occasion, but this would be true of any concession.) I suggest:-
'Alternatively, HMG could make other gestures to help Hong Kong. It would be valuable if we could consider on a case by case basis - taking the residue of those rescued by Hong Kong registered ships, since although Hong Kong may be deemed responsible for placing those rescued by their own shipping, they will obviously be reluctant to settle refugees in Hong Kong itself and we should help them on this where we can. There is currently,
for example, a group of 26 from one such ship still unplaced making it difficult for Hong Kong to press other flag states to remove their ship rescue cases. More could be done too by relaxing.
3. I hope this has not made the recommendation too unwieldy. But I fear the nuances of the arguments over ship rescues will have to be included somewhere or the rest of Whitehall will not buy it.
Cestyan
CM J Segar
South East Asian Dept W 86A 233 5073
30 November 1982