DWF TL21/36
LHL 216/34
BANGKOK TL 988
HỒNG KONG
FCO LONDON
PAVILA
JAKARTA
SINGAPORE
HANOI
UKMIS GENEVA
GRS 752
CONFIDENTIAL
TELELETTER
FROM:
FILE REFERENCE:-
FOLLOWING FOR:-
HKK 24-3/1
Na
MYK
D.A. BURNS, BANGKOK.
243/6 OF 23 MARCH 1982.
L.M. DAVIES, 5 FOR S, HONG KONG.
T.C.S. STITT, SEAD, FCO LONDON.
4.D. CLIFT, HRGD, FCO LONDON.
Käi
CHANCERIES: MANILA
JAKARTA
SINGAPORE
MANOI
UKMIS GENEVA
US REFUGEE POLICY: YOUR TELELETTER OF 11 MARCH TO CLIFT.
56
1. THERE ARE SIGNS HERE, TOO, OF THE HARDES AMERICAN LINE ON REFU- GEES. MY U.S. COLLEAGUE, WITH WHOM I DISCUSSED MATTERS ON 26 MARCH, GAVE 2 REASONS FOR IT AND MADE ONE IMPORTANT QUALIFICATION.
2. THE FIRST OF THE REASONS IS THE U.S. WISH TO SUPPORT THE THAI POLICY OF HUMANE DETERRENCE IN ORDER TO IMPRESS POTENTIAL INDO-CHIN- ESE REFUGEES THAT THERE IS LESS SCOPE THAN HITHERTO FOR IMMIGRATION INTO THE UNITED STATES. THE SECOND REASON IS THE PRESSURE FROM THE U.S. PUBLIC AND CONGRESS, FOLLOWING THE INFLUX OF CUBAN AND HAITIAN REFUGEES, TO CUT DOWN OVERALL NUMBERS ENTERING THE STATES FROM HOW ON. BOTH FACTORS LED THE AMERICANS TO CUT NEW LAO** AND VIETNAMESE REFUGEES FROM THEIR RESETTLEMENT QUOTAS, THUS CONSIDERABLY REDUCING THEIR MONTHLY INTAKE FROM THAILAND. THE RESULT WILL BE THAT IN FISCAL YEAR 1981/2, THE U.S. WILL PROBABLY TAKE ONLY 100,289 INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES, AS AGAINST 168,098 IN FISCAL YEAR 1992/1. THE IMPLICATION FOR THE FUTURE - IMPORTANT BUT DEPRESSING FOR US IN THE CONTEXT OF HONG KONG - IS THAT IN THE NEXT FISCAL YEAR - 1982/3 - THE .S IS LIKELY TO REDUCE ITS INTAKE OF INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES TO SOME 70,00K**. (AP QUOTED A FIGURE OF 72,000 RECENTLY IN A STORY FROM WASHINGTON). INDOCHINESE REFUGEES IN THIS SENSE MEANS THOSE FROM THAILAND, HONG KONG, MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA. THIS IS NOT THE WHOLE PICTURE BECAUSE THE ORDERLY DEPARTURE PROGRAMME FROM VIETNAM WILL ACCOMMODATE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO WILL COUNT AS IMM- GRANTS, NOT REFUGEES.
3. WHEN AMBASSADOR VINE VISITED BANGKOK, HE FOUND UNDERSTANDING FOR THE U.S. FOSITION AT THE HIGHER LEVELS OF THE THAI GOVERSMENT, AND RESENTMENT AND A GENERALLY MORE AGGRESSIVE POLICY AT LOWER LEVELS. THIS RESENTMENT WAS REFLECTED IN THE AFTER DINNER SPEECH BY DEPUTY INTERIOR MINISTER BANYAT (INKSTER'S TELELETTER OF 15 MARCH TO → STITT) THREATENING TO SOLVE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM BY MORE ROBUST MEANS IF WESTERN INTEREST DIMINISHED. THE STORY BEHIND THIS SPEECH IS A COMPLICATED ONE. IT WAS DRAFTED BY A HARDLINE YOUNG OFFICER IN THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR FOR DELIVERY BY HIS MINISTER. THE LATTER WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE REJECTED THE DRAFT OR AT ANY RATE CONSID- ERABLY SOFTENED IT. IN HIS ABSENCE, IT WAS DELIVERED BY THE DEPUTY MINISTER, WHORE KNOWLEDGE OF ENGLISH WAS LIMITED AND WHO SIMPLY READ WHAT WAS PUT IN FRONT OF HIM. THE VARIOUS THAI MINISTRIES HAVE MADE HANDSOME APOLOGIES TO THE U.S. BUT THE INCIDENT LEFT ITS MARK ON AMBASSADOR VINE IN WHAT MAY TURN OUT TO BE A POSITIVE WAY. HAVING BEEN EXPOSED TO THIS EXPRESSION OF GRASS ROOTS THAI FEELING, HE HAS RETURNED TO WASHINGTON PREPARED TO TRY TO PERSUADE CONGRESS TO REOPEN THE REFUGEE QUOTA FOR NEW KHMERS, UNDERSTAND THAT THESE SOUNDINGS HAVE SO FAR PROVED POSITIVE AND THAT CONGRESS MAY BE PERSUADED TO ADMIT BETWEEN 28-30,000 NEW KPMERS WITHIN THE OVERALL LIMIT OF 70,023 OR SO INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES. THE THAIS HAD ALSO PRE- SSED IN DESCENDING ORDER OF PREFERENCE FOR THE U.S. TO REOPEN ITS QUOTAS FOR OLD LAOS AND VIETNAMESE IN CAMPS IN THAILAND. THE U.S. HAVE VIRTUALLY EXHAUSTED THE POSSIBILITY OF FINDING SUITABLE
'OLD LAOS IN THE CAMPS HERE BUT MAY BE ABLE TO HELP ON AN AD NOC BASIS WITH THE VIETNAMESE IN CAMP NW82 (DAVID CRYSTAL IS REPORTING SEPARATELY ON A RECENT ICHC MEETING ABOUT THIS).
4. THE IMPORTANT QUALIFICATION THAT HAS TO BE MADE IN DISCUSSING THE HARDER AMERICAN LINE ON REFUGEES CONCERNS THEIR STATED COMMITMENT TO HELP THAILAND REDUCE THE REFUGEE BURDEN HERE. THEY DO NOT PROPOSE TO RENEGE ON THIS - NOR IS IT LIKELY THAT THE THAIS WILL LET THEM. WHILE REMAINING FIRM ON THE SURFACE (FOR THE PURPOSES OF HUMANE JETERRENCE) THE AMERICANS ARE LIKELY TO TRY TO FIND WAYS IN WHICH THEY CAN HELP RUN DOWN THE NUMBERS IN THE MAIN HOLDING CENTRES IN THAILAND. THE MAIN ONE, KHAG-1-DANG, IS ALREADY REDUCED TO 41,800 AND THE TOTAL EN ALL HOLDING CENTRES TO 91,700 APPROX. AMERICAN AND FRENCH ACCEPTANCES WILL REDUCE THIS NUMBER FERHAPS SUBSTANTIALLY BY THE END OF THE YEAR. THE U.5. EMBASSY HERE AVJ, WE BELIEVE AMBASSA OR VINE, ARE DETERINED BY SUCH MEANS TO PREVENT HOT HEADS IN THE THAT ADMINISTRATION RESORTING TO YEASURES WHICH THE U.S. (AND WE) WOULD DEPLORE. ALTHOUGH THESE ARE CURRENTLY UNDER CONTROL A FAILURE TO EFFECT A STEADY REDUCTION OF NUMBERS IN THE HOLDING CENTRES COULD CHANGE THE SITUATION AND LEAD TO THREATS OF A MORE AGGRESSIVE THAI POLICY.
D.A. BURNS.
ANNN
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