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CONFIDENTIAL.
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CONFIDENTIAL HKK 243/1.
FM UKMIS GENEVA 191800Z FEB 82
TO PRIORITY FCO
TELNO 71 OF 19 FEBRUARY 1982
INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG
INFO SAVING WASHINGTON AND MANILA
YOUR TELNO
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INDEX
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(NOT TO MANILA): VIETNAMESE REFUGEES IN HONG KONG
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1. HEAD OF CHANCERY AND ADAMS CALLED AT UNHCR ON 19 FEBRUARY ON MOUSSALLI, DIRECTOR OF PROTECTION AND SEVERAL MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF. THEY SPOKE AS INSTRUCTED. THE FURTHER MATERIAL. FROM HONG KONG HAS NOT YET ARRIVED AND WE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT NOT TO LOSE TIME. WE CAN SEND ON TO UNHCR ANY FURTHER MATERIAL
FROM HONG KONG WHEN RECEIVED.
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THE FURTHER MATERIAL Provide ammunitien
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2. MOUSSALLI WAS SYMPATHETIC. HE ACKNOWLEDGED HONG KONG'S GENEROUS RECORD IN THE TREATMENT OF REFUGEES. UNHCR WERE ALREADY WELL AWARE OF HONG KONG'S LATEST DIFFICULTIES AND THE POLITICAL IMPACT IN HONG KONG
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OF REFUGEE MATTERS. THEY HAD ORGANISED AN INTERNAL MEETING ON THE SUBJECT IN THE LAST FEW DAYS. MOUSSALLI AGREED THAT THE US ATTITUDE WAS CRUCIAL. THE STATE DEPARTMENT WERE ORGANISING A MEETING OF SENIOR US OFFICIALS AND VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS IN MANILA IN EARLY MARCH TO DISCUSS REFUGEE POLICIES, INCLUDING THE CRITERIA TO BE USED. UNHCR WERE
INVITED AND MEANT TO EXPRESS AT THIS MEETING THEIR CONCERN AT HONG KONG PROBLEMS OVER THE 4E CATEGORY. MOUSALLI
UNDERTOOK TO PROVIDE A CONSIDERED RESPONSE TO OUR DEMARCHE AFTER THE MANILA MEETING.
3. IN INFORMAL DISCUSSION MOUSSALLI FLOATED SOME IDEAS ABOUT HUMANE DETERENCE. HE THOUGHT MORE EFFECTIVE SCREENING ON ARRIVAL, WITH UNHCR PARTICIPATION, MIGHT HELP.
IF THE 1951 CONVENTION WERE ACCEPTED IN HONG KONG, THIS COULD HELP JUSTIFY DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN HONG KONG AND
OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION OVER ACCEPTING REFUGEES
FOR RESETTLEMENT. THOSE ACKNOWLEDGED IN THE SCREENING PROCESS
AS ENTITLED TO REFUGEE STATUS WOULD EVENTUALLY BE RESETTLED.
FOR THE REST ALESSER SOLUTION MIGHT BE CONSIDERED SUCH AS PUTTING THEM IN HOLDING CENTRES ON CHINESE TERRITORY. IF THIS COULD
BE ORGANISED IT WOULD HAVE AN IMMEDIATE DETERRENT EFFECT ON WOULD
BE EMIGRANTS STILL IN VIETNAM.
4. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THE IMPORTANCE OF DEALING WITH THE CONTINUING FLOW, BUT ALSO STRESSED THE PROBLEM OF THE
HARD CORE WHICH HAD NOW APPARENTLY BECOME UNPLACEABLE. MOUSSALL I ACCEPTED THIS POINT. HE HOPED TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE WITH US AND LOOKED FORWARD TO THE VISIT TO GENEVA IN LATE MARCH OF SIR E YOUDE. MOUSSALLI MENTIONED THE UK AS A COUNTRY OF RESETTLEMENT BUT WAS RAPIDLY BROUGHT BACK TO THE MAIN POINT IN HAND.
CONFIDENTIAL
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COMMENT
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