CONFIDENTIAL
4. The conversation then turned, rather less interestingly, to possible innovative destinations. I told M Casella that we had been over most of the ground in 1979 - Belize and other Latin American locations. Pacific islands, etc - and had given up, primarily in the light of the offers made available by more attractive destinations at the Geneva meeting. It did not seem promising. But the implication again was that indefinite detention on a remote island without access to resettlement would be acceptable to UNIICR as an attempt to stop the flow from Vietnam.
5.
COMMENT. I am not sure where this leaves us. We shall clearly need to consider an early demarche to the Americans (i.e. later this week). While the suggestion that the problem might be handed over to the Chinese (e.g. in a camp in Guangdong, just across the border) is absurd, it also serves to remind us that the normal route to Hong Kong from Vietnam involves the positive assistance of Chinese officials, and that the flow of direct arrivals could in principle be restricted if the Chinese towed them back into Vietnamese waters or interned them at first landfall. So perhaps discussions with the Chinese seeking a cooperative solution are not that wild an idea. Nor, now that the Philippines have (apparently) acceded to the 1951 Convention, is a reconsideration of Hong Kong's attitude. And if the Thais go ahead with an offshore island and no resettlement for future boat people, at least Hong Kong would not be breaking new ground.
23 February 1982
cc:
UND
Mr Donald o.r.
Mr Long, UKMIS, Geneva
CONFIDENTIAL
Musse.
Ми
TCS Stitt
South East Asian Department