CONFIDENTIAL
1.
Mr Vine explained that he had come from a meeting in Manila of US Government officials and repre-
sentatives of the agencies involved with South-East
Asian refugees. America now faced an increasing problem
over the political acceptability of large-scale resettle-
ment. She had accepted more than 580,000 refugees from South-East Asia since 1975, and was facing a sharp public reaction. He was under strong pressure from Congress to reduce the programme particularly because the more recent arrivals seemed increasingly to bear the hallmarks
of economic migrants. America therefore wished to reduce
resettlement, but in a way which would not harm either
the security of genuine refugees, or the United States'
reputation as a traditional haven for them: "we are
therefore developing a policy: slow, but increasingly
restrictive". Two further measures had been decided on
in Manila. There would be a further tightening up of the
categories acceptable for resettlement, which would go
beyond the exclusion of Categories 4D and 4E, introduced
on 4 December 1981: from now on only those with close
family ties in America, or a demonstrable and substantial
link with the country, would be eligible. Secondly, the
U.S. Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS) would
now be required to determine in each case whether an
applicant was a genuine refugee. This would be done in
accordance with existing UNHCR procedures; and Mr Vine
expected its effect to be gradual rather than abrupt.
The message America was increasingly trying to convey was that if a refugee had no links with the USA, he should
not assume that he would ever get resettled there. They
were planning to put this over in several ways, including
VOA announcements and publicising the changes among the
Vietnamese community in the USA. In sum, "we are trying
to bring this programme to an orderly close".
CONFIDENTIAL
/2.
In answer