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IAL IX 14
4.
satisfactory control. If RAN concluded that Vietnam had such ability, the UK would be unlikely to object to reducing the HK FIR to its former size. However, if RAN concluded that Vietnam was not capable of resuming control, and wished the status quo to be maintained, the UK would probably agree. Keep then, suggested a fourth option which might be raised: to carry out a complete review of the Region's FIR boundaries and airways. RAN's prime objectives should be to improve safety and to secure the efficient handling of traffic.
Speaking of Option A, Xu asked if some improvements could be made to present arrangements. The HK side suggested relocation/ adjustment/elimination of danger areas to allow the uninterrupted use of A901 or A1, but that relocating or lowering D4 would appear to be the quickest satisfactory solution. A route via South China to Bangkok was considered more circuitous. Concerning improvements to the control of the southern part of the AOR, Xu mentioned that the facilities currently installed on Dong Dao (Paracel Islands) were a Non-Directional beacon and a VHF omni-range beacon and that there would be a Distance Measuring Equipment, although these facilities were not in the Air Navigation Plan (ANP). Also primary radar had been installed. This led to the consideration of the Singapore route being aligned through Dong Dao and in turn a laterally separated Bangkok route which happened to coincide with the ANP route Amber 5 via Danang.
Paracels.
5.
Mr. Yu indicated SAR facilities were available on the
If the South China Sea area were to be controlled by HK or PRC, PRC would consider providing secondary radar on Hainan and/or on the Paracel Islands. However this would take not less than 2-3 years to effect.
6.
The two sides agreed that the RAN would probably accept a phased solution along the lines of (i) a continuation of the status quo with some immediate improvements (either adjusting the danger areas to enable uninterrupted use of Anber 1/A901 or introducing Amber 2 (a straightened Amber 1 would be Amber 5 in ANP) followed in the medium term by (ii) introduction of a Hong Kong quote sub-centre unquote for control of the AOR and southern portion of the existing HK FIR, using information from primary radar and communication facilities located on the Paracels but electronically relayed to Hong Kong, followed by (iii) installation of secondary radar on the Paracels with information also relayed electronically to Hong Kong, followed ultimately by (iv) a PRC FIR based on Paracels controlling an area over the South China Sea in excess of the AOR and extending to Hainan Island. All this could be discussed between the PRC and Hong Kong after the RAN meeting if the decision was to adopt either Option A or B. If Option C was adopted, the advantages flowing from such arrangements would not be available.
7.
Keep indicated that, from a purely aviation point of view, option (A) was not an unattractive package which it would be for the PRC to propose and which might well gain RAN approval. However, it was important not to discount the Vietnamese case too quickly as they might advance evidence to support their claim to capability and/or seek a technical assistance programme. It was very important that any proposal
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