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to
However. it is essential
resolve the dispute over Tianjin/Peking services. which will become acute
acute next summer, in
a way which ensures that some United Kingdom airline gets a reasonable share of the additional capacity over and above 5 x B707s which will be needed between Hong Kong and Peking next summer. There was evidence to suggest that even in 1982 CAAC were thinking of operating 7 Tianjin services, and we should like to know what capacity you judge will be needed next year between Hong Kong and Peking.
5
it
Extension of the status quo is unacceptable because results in an unsatisfactory indirect service for the travelling public and invites CAAC to continue tc abuse their right to provide an unreciprocated service to Tianjin in order to maintain and extend a permanent monopoly on Hong Kong/Peking services to which they are not entitled either by the 1979 agreement or by their permits which reflect it. It is important to try to negotiate a way out of this situation now. not just in air services terms,
but also in the wider context of Hong Kong's relations with China since monopoly services have
have implications for sovereignty.
we
6 Thus if you still do not agree that
should adopt the course proposed in paragraph 2 above. the only practical option if the demand for services between Hong Kong and Peking is to be met on anything other than a monopoly basis by CAAC is to build on the proposals which BA have been exploring informally and on their own initiative in Peking SO that they might carry a significant quota of
quota of local traffic in exchange for
for additional Hong Kong/Peking services by CAAC. Looking further ahead. if BA Can establish the right to a share of local Hong Kong/Peking traffic. this should improve the chances of CPA being allowed to assume such rights at a later date.
2
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