the Chinese authorities would be likely to exact a price for their co-operation. This could well be in terms of the sharing of traffic rights. Another possibility would be the award of contracts to Chinese organisa- tions. The risk of such demands being unacceptably heavy cannot be ruled out;
to embark on a full consultancy on Deep Bay now could focus the minds of the Chinese authorities on this option. They might in consequence decide that it would suit them. It would then be much more difficult to reject Deep Bay, even if the conclusions of the full study clearly favoured CLK; and
if relations with China were to deteriorate the capacity of the Chinese authorities to make difficulties e.g. by denying control of airspace, would be much greater than in the case of CLK (or Kai Tak).
The developmental arguments are broadly in favour of further study of the Deep Bay option; the operational arguments against. As indicated in paragraph 8 above, there would also be strong political disadvantages in siting the airport close to Chinese territory in Deep Bay. The Embassy in Peking and the FCO have been consulted and agree that these arguments are overriding. It has therefore been decided not to proceed with a full Deep Bay consultancy but to concentrate on CLK.
Financial and staffing implications
11
There are no direct financial implications.
Public Relations Aspects Consultation
12
The aviation Advisory Board has been consulted. The Board confirms its previous advice that in civil aviation terms a site at Chek Lap Kok was to be preferred to a site in Deep Bay. Having considered also the points presented at paragraphs 8 and 9 of this memorandum, the Board advised against further studies on the feasibility of a site in Deep Bay for a replacement airport.
Public reaction
13
The press have shown a considerable amount of interest in Deep Bay as an alternative to CLK as the site for a replacement international airport. This interest has been
SECRET