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would be seriously undermined, and people in Hong Kong would
fear that China would be free to take action in the external
field which might damage the territory.
There would also be
numerous practical difficulties, and problems over
nationality (see Annex K).
Effect of Relinquishment of Sovereignty
8. This would terminate the UK's responsibility for
external relations in respect of Hong Kong, and that responsi-
bility would devolve on the PRC unless arrangements were made
between the UK and the PRC to permit the UK to continue to
exercise that responsibility, or to be responsible for the
conduct of external relations (see paragraph 9 below).
Recognition. of Chinese Sovereignty with Continuing British Administration
9. A distinction exists between (a) having responsibility
for external relations and (b) having responsibility for the
conduct of external relations. For example, HMG have (a) in
relation to Brunei but had (b) in relation to the Gulf States.
For Tonga, HMG had (a) and (b), though presumably (a) subsumed
(b).
10. If the Chinese were prepared to concede that the UK should
continue to have responsibility for external affairs (or for
the conduct of them) they could require explicit assurances
that the UK's authority would not be exercised to the detriment
of the PRC. They might well seek consultation arrangements to
reinforce these assurances. Consultation of some sort would
probably be unavoidable but should be kept as informal as
possible.
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/11.