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FM FCO 23170OZ JUN 82
1357
HIR oyol
No. 51
24 JUN 987
TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG
358
TELEGRAM NUMBER 473 OF 23 JUNE
No
сче
PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR FROM DONALD.
(368)
INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR)
20/6 pasa816!
YOUR TELNOS 647 AND 648 AND PEKING TELNO 353: FUTURE OF HONG KONG
1. THANK YOU FOR THESE IDEAS. I UNDERSTAND YOUR ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF SOME SOFTENING UP OF THE CHINESE IN ADVANCE BUT I
ALSO FIND THE POINTS MADE BY PERCY CRADOCK PERSUASIVE. THE NEED
TO OBTAIN A MINISTERIAL DECISION ON OUR POLICY REMAINS AS FUNDA-
MENTAL AS EVER AND THE FALKLAND ISLANDS SITUATION HAS CONTINUED
TO PUT BACK THE TIMETABLE ON WHICH THAT IS LIKELY TO BE REACHED.
ON PRESENT PLANNING WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO BROACH THE SUBJECT WITH
THE PRIME MINISTER BEFORE LATE JULY AND SHE MAY WANT FURTHER
DISCUSSION WITH HER COLLEAGUES AFTER THAT.
2.
MOREOVER, AT OFFICIAL LEVEL WE AGREE WITH YOU ON THE MINIMUM OBJECTIVE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER 1S VISIT, IE AGREEMENT ON SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OFFICIALS. IT MAY INDEED
TACTICALLY BE BEST TO LIMIT OURSELVES TO THIS OBJECTIVE, SINCE IT
IS VERY UNLIKELY THAT FIRM AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANCE COULD BE
REACHED IN THE SHORT TIME AVAILABLE. THIS REINFORCES PERCY
CRADOCK'S VIEW THAT WE SHOULD AVOID PRE-EMPTING THE PRIME MINISTER. IT IS OF COURSE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT, IF MINISTERS AGREE THAT SOVEREIGNTY COULD BE NEGOTIABLE (AND THIS
IS FAR FROM CERTAIN YET), THIS POINT SHOULD BE MADE BY THE
PRIME MINISTER HERSELF, DEPENDING ON THE COURSE OF HER TALKS IN
PEKING.
3.
WE THEREFORE THINK THAT A VISIT BY YOU TO PEKING BEFORE
THE PRIME MINISTER SHOULD BE AVOIDED. AS FOR CANTON, IF YOU
FELT THAT A VISIT THERE WOULD BE USEFUL FOR GENERAL RELATIONS
WITH THE PROVINCE, WE SHOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION. HOWEVER, WE ARE
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