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Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AH
25 March 1982
152
notus
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31/3
Sir Murray MacLehose GBE KCMG KCVO Governor and Commander-in-Chief
HONG KONG
Dear Murray,
FUTURE OF HONG KONG: POSSIBLE VISIT TO CHINA BY SIR EDWARD YOUDE
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We have been giving some thought to the possibility that the Chinese Government may invite Teddy Youde to visit China after he has taken up his post as Governor. It seemed
to us that it would be worth while doing some contingency planning on this in order to work out a general line, so that not too much time need be taken up with consultation if and when an invitation does materialise. This might also be a subject which could come up when you and Teddy see the Prime Minister in mid-May when you are both in London after your departure. Before we make any submission to Ministers, we thought we would seek your and Percy Cradock's views.
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2. The first and obvious point is that Sino-British and Sino-Hong Kong relations would obviously demand acceptance of such an invitation. From there we move on to timing. While it would be wrong to delay a visit for too long for fear of appearing to slight Peking, we do not think it would be right for Teddy to give the impression of hurrying off to China too quickly after he had taken up his job. In other words, we think June or July would be too early. But there might well be pressure on him not to delay too long after that, and, other things being equal, a visit in August would probably be right.
3. Of course this bring us up against the Prime Minister's visit and the problem of whether Teddy would or should be seen as making some kind of preparation for that. On the assumption that our own Ministers will by then have decided on a general line for the Prime Minister to follow, and depending on any other signals we have had from the Chinese, there might by August be advantage in our taking the opportunity of a visit by Teddy to sound the Chinese out, since he would almost certainly be received at a high level.
4.
If that were agreed we would need to decide how far he should go in giving the Chinese advance notice of the general scope of the sort of agreement we have in mind. There are obvious problems about this, not least the risk of the Chinese giving a brush off to the idea of continuing British administration before Mrs Thatcher goes to Peking. But I do not think that the Chinese would be likely to go so far as that and by that stage there might well be advantage in explaining our views on British administration with an indication (though
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