CONFIDENTIAL
265 - 1
WANT TO ENLIST THE ASSISTANCE OF THIRD COUNTRIES: WHILE THEIR
INTENTIONS MIGHT BE ENTIRELY WELL MOTIVATED, THE CHINESE COULD
WELL TAKE SUCH MOVES AMISS AND GET THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE
TRYING TO ORGANISE PRESSURE ON THEM.
4. THE BEST WAY TO HANDLE ALL THIS INTEREST, AS YOU RIGHTLY
POINT OUT, IS TO PLAY THINGS LONG FOR THE TIME BEING. WE HAVE
DONE A GOOD DEAL OF BACKGROUND THINKING ON THIS QUESTION BUT
UNTIL WE HAVE GOT OUR STRATEGY RIGHT FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S
VISIT, WE ARE SOMEWHAT INHIBITED IN DISCUSSION EXCEPT IN A
STRICTLY LIMITED SECRET CIRCLE. HOWEVER, WE HOPE TO PRODUCE SOME
GUIDANCE ON THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG DURING THE COURSE OF THE
SUMMER AS GENERAL BACKGROUND ON WHICH TO DRAW IN RESPONSE TO
INTERESTED ENQUIRERS.
167A
5. FINALLY, ON PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELELETTER OF 31 MARCH, I
HOPE THAT A GOOD DEAL OF THE BRIEFING OF THE JAPANESE OF THE KIND
SUFFICIENT FOR THEM TO BRIEF THEIR OWN BUSINESSMEN CAN BE DONE
EITHER IN HONG KONG (WHERE QUESTIONS OF CONFIDENCE ARE MOST LIKE-
LY TO ARISE) OR HERE IN LONDON. I OR SYDNEY GIFFARD CAN ALWAYS
GIVE CONFIDENTIAL BRIEFING ON WHAT IS CLEARLY AN EXTREMELY
SENSITIVE SUBJECT. I TAKE YOUR POINT THAT THE SUBJECT WILL
BECOME INCREASINGLY LIVE IN VIEW OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO
JAPAN AND CHINA THIS AUTUMN. I WOULD EXPECT, HOWEVER, THAT THE
PRIME MINISTER WOULD IF THE NEED AROSE BE ABLE TO BRIEF THE
JAPANESE PERSONALLY DURING HER VISIT. BUT THERE IS NO NEED TO
ADVERTISE THIS IN ADVANCE.
SIGNED A E DONALD
2
CONFIDENTIAL