1
Mr Burrows
Legal Advisers
cc: Sir Ian Sinclair
Mr Donald
FED
für
Reg. Rehm to thBurrows for
his files.
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FUTURE OF HONG KONG
1.
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Thank you for your minute (undated) in reply to mine of 22 March concerning Sir Percy Craddock's letter of 15 March 22A I have also seen your minute of 30 March to Mr Morris about our draft paper on the legal implications of certain possible options (I am sending copies of this to Sir Ian Sinclair, Mr Donald and FED so that they are kept up to date).
2.
I take the point that ideally any understanding reached with the Chinese should be explicit and clearly defined and should, if possible, take the form of a formal, binding bilateral agreement. When it comes to negotiating with the Chinese, however, I am very much afraid that, like it or not, we shall have to accept that things may move into a much greyer area, where what is not said will be every bit as important as what is said, and where the way things are presented will matter a great deal to the Chinese. We might just find that, when it came to it, the Chinese were seeking a full and detailed agreement
and we cannot rule this out entirely but it seems much more likely to me that they will be seeking as short and as anodyne an agreement, statement or understanding, as possible.
3.
Of course, no one can be sure how negotiations will turn out until they actually begin but what is crucial is that the Prime Minister, in September, goes armed with as wide a range as possible of formulae on which we might meet the Chinese. It is for this reason that we have been trying to produce a sliding scale showing all the options, ranging from the briefest and most anodyne 'understanding' to a clearly worded agreement embodying a straignt sovereignty/administration deal. In drawing up this scale we also wanted to show at which point along the scale an Act of Parliament became necessary. According to your latest
/comments
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