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8
DSR 11C
+
E)
(ii) Problems for HMG. Almost certainly would be
combined with Chinese demand that HMG concede Chinese
sovereignty. Still, better than (C), as it guarantees
length of tenure. Powers of continuing administration
could be tied to Chinese declaration. So could land
leases. Both require Chinese assurances about the
period of warning to be made public in some firms.
for continued British administration would have to be
Chief drawback lies in the fa
negotiated with Chinese.
that the assurance is only effective so long as the
Chinese do not institute a period of warning.
Bas
As soon
as that happened we would face weakening confidence in Hong Kong, although certainly firms and others would ha
as much time as they have now to make their plans.
(iii)
Effect. Major boost to confidence.
Sufficient
to halt slide of confidence. But only provided it was
quickly followed by UK legislation to bring British jurisdiction and powers of administration into line wil new concept of validity of 15 years constantly rolled forward until notice given by CPG. The legal mechanics
would need to be worked out.
Unilateral action by HMG to take powers to issue land
leases beyond 1997; assurance of tacit Chinese approv:
Likelihood. Possible, particularly if done in
(i)
form of automatically renewable periodic leases and wit
no mention of 1997. Chinese might see it as a necessa
Has advantage.
way of preserving investor confidence.
requiring little action on their part.
(ii) Problems for HMG. Only a temporary palliative
unless coupled with power of continuing administration (iii) Effect. If done now, a short-term beneficial
/effect
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