JONNY DENNIAL
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to provide a face-saving device and a substitute for the
Soviet Union which would preserve Vietnam's sense of security.
It was difficult to see what this substitute could be.
The United States had withdrawn from South East Asia and ASEAN
did not have the military power, or desire, to assume
responsibility.
2. Lord Carrington continued that he had also discerned a
difference of emphasis or at any rate opinion about the nature
of the threat. Some in ASEAN rated China a greater threat than
Vietnam. The resolution of this difference of perception would
to some extent determine the solution. The Khmer Rouge worried
those who were frightened of China; Heng Samrin worried those who
were frightened of Vietnam. Lord Carrington said that, although
it was a cynical thought which left aside the human misery of the
people of Cambodia, the present state of affairs was not wholly
unsatisfactory. Neither China nor Vietnam had the upper hand.
His conclusion was that there was little more that ASEAN could
or should be doing other than continue to try to establish a loose
coalition, and build up Son Sann's position.
3.
Mr Dhanabalan agreed that, cynical or not, Lord Carrington's
assessment was realistic. A stalemate was not against ASEAN's
interest. It had locked the Vietnamese into a struggle against
the Chinese. But there were worrying trends, notably the build-up
of the Soviet stake in Indo-China. He thought that the differences
of perception within ASEAN should not be seen in terms of Vietnam
versus China since Vietnam on its own was not a threat. It was the
combination of Vietnam and the Soviet Union which was worrying
and Singapore's perception which, he believed,
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