mable indùs unha ay.ipment and a migration of professionally and technically qualified people, leaving Hongkong in an Impossible itation. Tather thur.
to Chiva, Hongkong
would then boa pecat burden instead. Of course, after
regaining the sovereignty of Hongkong, Peking could reshape Hongkong according to its own plans, but in the transitional period, there would inevitably be political and economical changes and socio-psychological disorder. This period of disruption and readjustment could be very long. Thus, exactly when China needs Hongkong most in its attempt at modernization,
Hongkong would become a worse than useless encumbrance.
(iii)
Practicability
it
Any agreement on the future of Hongkong should avoid unnecessary complications. If the method of a "joint communique" is adopted, it may be simple but will have no legal validity. If a treaty specifically dealing with the status of Hongkong is signed,
would seem to necessitate an immediate solution to the problem of sovereignty, but, as we all understand, it is not yet the most opportune time to deal with this basic and controversial issue. Again, if Hongkong is to be made into an international free port or a United Nations trust territory, this would complicate matters further by involving parties other than
China and Great Britain.
IV. THE SOLUTION MOST WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION
From the above considerations it can be seen that the ideas
of a joint-communique, of a treaty on the status of Hongkong, or of making Hongkong an international free port, are all infeasible. Furthermore, there has also been the proposal that Hongkong should become an independent state. But this is obviously unacceptable to Peking, and there is the further