CONFIDENTIAL
- 3
-
Western concern about Poland to the Soviet Union and in warning
that, were they to interfere directly, much stronger measures
would follow.
4.
Mr Atkins then informed the Vice Foreign Minister that
General Jaruzelski had two days previously explained his recent steps to Western Ambassadors. He had repeated his view that the
only alternative to military intervention would have been civil
war and that the military government was only temporary.
Later,
on 4 January, EC Foreign Ministers had issued a communiqué on
Poland following a meeting in Brussels. The Lord Privy Seal
handed a copy to the Vice Foreign Minister (Brussels Telegram
002 of 5 January) and asked for his comments on Poland.
5.
1
Mr Zhang Canming agreed that reliable information was
extremely limited but that the military government had been
largely successful in imposing order. However the fundamental
questions, and in particular the economic problem had not been
solved. There were different views on the extent of Soviet
intervention. Mr Zhang said that it was inconceivable that the
Soviet Union had had no information in advance that martial law
would be declared, but that so far there was indeed no evidence
of direct, open interference. The Chinese Government was watching
developments closely. Its consistent view had been that the
affairs of Poland should be settled by the Polish people. China
firmly opposed outside intervention, and hoped that the Polish
problem would be solved peacefully in accordance with the
interests of the State of Poland and the Polish nation.
6.
Mr Atkins expressed concern about the possibility of
the Soviet Union taking a more active role. He foresaw two
alternative circumstances in which this might happen:
(i) if martial law proved unable to keep order (this did
not seem to be the case at present); or
(ii) if the Polish economy were to collapse.
It was currently in great difficulty; Poland had huge debts all
CONFIDENTIAL
/over