8
MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE
9 December 1975]
Mr R J ANDREW, Mr J M PARKIN, Mr W G MANN, Captain T H BRADBURY, RN, and Group Captain F D G CLARK
imponderable, in their recruiting, but we are trying to do what we can to get the troops in Hong Kong out of Hong Kong on training exercises. We recognise that the geography of Hong Kong places limitations on their training, and we do at the moment have a training pro- gramme which involves eight companies a year going from Hong Kong to Brunei and one company to Australia and one company to Fiji. We hope this will con- tinue and will, therefore, provide outlets outside Hong Kong, but we do recog- nise that once the artillery battery has left Hong Kong there will be very little training with other arms. This is re- grettable but we see no way round it.
24. What about Suffield? Have you looked at that?- -Yes, we have looked at that and it would be an extremely ex- pensive business to take a unit from Hong Kong to Suffield. We have looked at the cost of this and the figure I have been given is something like £450,000 to fly a complete unit to Suffield, maintain it in Suffield and fly it back again. This is a very high figure and at the moment we do not feel it would be justified, given that the Gurkhas in Hong Kong will not, in foreseeable circumstances, require to be trained in the sort of operational role for which Suffield is used, namely for training NATO battle groups.
25. It was made fairly clear to us in more than one place in Hong Kong that the decision has already been taken to wipe the Gurkha units in the United Kingdom off the order of battle. Can you confirm or deny that?—I would say that no final decision has yet been taken,
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Mr Conlan
26. Is it a practicable proposition to keep one Ghurka battalion in Nepal?
This is something which we would have to consider. It would involve nugatory expenditure in that there is no operational requirement to have a bat- talion in Nepal, and it would only be there, presumably, to permit a degree of mobility.
27. Is there any particular reason why a battalion is kept in Brunei?—Yes.
[Continued
28. Training?--No, it is more than training; it is part of an agreement with the Ruler of Bunei to have a battalion there.
29. For which he pays? That is right, and which, from the British Army point of view, is a convenient arrange- ment.
30. General Bramall put great value on the battalion that is in Brunei now, but if political circumstances arose in which the situation went sour in Brunei and, therefore, the battalion could no longer be kept there, what would be the alternatives?- -Do you mean in respect of Hong Kong?
31. The battalion in Brunei is there as a sort of reserve battalion for support- ing Hong Kong in case of difficulty. If the battalion were not in Brunei because of political circumstances, where would General Bramall or his successor look for his reserve battalion? -This is something on which we have at the moment no firm plans because we do not know how long that battalion is going to remain in Brunei. While it is there, in addition to its task in Brunei it provides a convenient local reinforce- ment for Hong Kong. If the time comes, as it may do within a few years, when that battalion is no longer in Brunei, we shall then have to discuss with the Hong Kong Government the implications for Hong Kong. Broadly, there are two possibilities: one is to station an additional battalion in Hong Kong; the other is to rely on reinforce- ment from the United Kingdom, which, of course, takes a good deal longer than reinforcement from Brunei. But this is something we would have to discuss with the Hong Kong Government at the time.
Mr Finsberg
32. In how much detail have you worked out the problem of bringing re- inforcements from the UK within a period of three weeks and how practical will it be with the reduction in RAF transport aircraft and when the staging posts have disappeared?---We have given thought to this. I would say that the figure of three weeks which has been quoted is a worst case; we would