t
IN CONFIDENCE
HONG KONG
[Note: the supporting documentation for this part of the visit is particularly extensive and is available in the Committee Office. Texts of all briefings given are available.]
Thursday 8th July
On arrival in Hong Kong the Committee were greeted by General John Chapple, Commander British Forces, who gave a very short preliminary briefing. The Committee then visited Argyle 3 Camp for Vietnamese Refugees1.
Friday 9th July
BRIEFING BY COMMANDER BRITISH FORCES
A comprehensive background to the problems of garrisoning Hong Kong was given by CBF. With the colony's large (5 million) and congested (3 metres of road for every registered car) population, there were only 0.15 soldiers per civilian, about a tenth of what there would be in a European country. However, after a dramatic reduction in the number of illegal immigrants (see POLMIL briefing below) and the expansion of the Hong Kong Police, CBF believed that the force level was adequate for all known and perceived threats over the next decade - provided that the Brunei garrison remained a a source of in-theatre reinforcement. The military role was primarily that of internal security with territorial integrity a second priority. The most important current task was still the control of illegal immigration.
The British military presence in Hong Kong was described as not a very sensitive issue. Seventy-five per cent of the costs were borne readily by the Hong Kong Government under the Defence Costs Agreement of 1981. There was a constant danger that British Forces might appear to be training for a counter- insurgency role, but the Hong Kong public had been reassured by the manner in which British Forces had worked alongside the Hong Kong Police during the 1960s riots which coincided with the cultural revolution in the People's Republic of China. Although there was no representational democracy in Hong Kong, there were many consultative bodies through which any popular hostility to the British military presence could be expected to express itself. On the future of Hong Kong after the expiry of its lease in 1997, CBF was optimistic. Both Britain and mainland China had a vested interest in the status quo being maintained in some form or another Britain because of its commercial interests (especially in communications) and China because the trading value of Hong Kong (15% of Chinese exports) outweighed its possible emergence as a 'Third' China if it were ever to become a democracy (which China would
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A brief provided by the Hong Kong Government is available in the Committee Office.
1.