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a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations
of human rights and fundamental freedoms as indicated in
paragraph 14 of this Report. This limitation serves to
differentiate the work of the Committee from that of other
bodies entitled to receive and consider as such individual
petitions or complaints pursuant to specific treaties and
under the conditions laid down in those treaties. The
procedures under Resolution 1503 of the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) bear some resemblance
to the activities of the Committee. But the analogy is by
no means exact. The members of the Committee would serve
in their individual capacity and not as representatives of
their Governments. Furthermore, the activities of the
Committee would be entirely confidential. Finally, it could
be expressly stipulated (and we have so recommended in
paragraph 16 that the Committee should not take up any
matters already under investigation by other competent
international bodies.
19.
We considered carefully whether the objectives stated
in paragraphs 13 and 14 could be achieved by other means. Une alternative approach would have been to envisage the appointment of a Commonwealth High Commissioner for Human Rights. However, we concluded that objection might be raised to vesting wide-ranging powers in a single individual, however eminent and well-regarded. Furthermore, confusion might result if the proposal (at present under consideration in the United Nations) to establish a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights were to be adopted since this would inevitably create a further risk of overlapping jurisdiction.
reasons
For these
Another alter-
we did not favour this alternative.
native approach would have been simply to establish a panel of human rights experts whose services could be called upon to carry out an investigation and/or exercise good offices on an ad hoc basis at the invitation of Commonwealth Heads of
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