CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
5.
If PQs are put down on this we shall of course be able to
consult Hong Kong and Peking on proposed answers. However, there
may be occasions such as Parliamentary Debates on the Falkland
Islands crisis when it will not be possible to maintain the
defensive line in 2(i) above. We have, therefore, prepared a set
of draft answers to likely questions (attached) for further
defensive use by Ministers.
6. There are serious potential difficulties. The Hong Kong
situation, though similar to the Falkland Islands in the sense
that both are Dependent Territories, is otherwise different as
follows:
a) the main area is under lease, terminating in 1997; this
means that our claim to sovereignty is, in part, limited;
b) there is no threat of armed force by China against Hong
Kong; the Chinese acknowledge that the problem should be
dealt with by peaceful negotiation;
c) if China's policy altered, it would not be practical to
defend Hong Kong against determined attack although the
garrison might be used to deter this;
d) (a) and (c) together with China's well-known refusal to
contemplate an independent Hong Kong means that the
principle of self determination cannot be applied there.
In any replies applying to the Dependent Territories in general
or to Hong Kong in particular, which may arise in the Falkland
Islands context, we need to guard against anything being said which
could either weaken confidence about HMG's commitment to Hong Kong
or circumscribe Ministers' room for negotiation of the future of
the Territory.
23 April 1982
бир
R D Clift
Hong Kong and General CONFIDENTIAL
/In preparing
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