Mr Mallaby
cc: PS/PUS
Mr Goodison IIKGD ✔
Sir E Youde
FALKLANDS CRISIS:
1.
THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER
SECTION 3 (4) OF THE
PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958.
No 26/4 ft.
WIDER IMPLICATIONS
JA
Thank you for the copy of your minute of 12 April to Mr Clift. We too have been concerned at the implications for Hong Kong, I am sure that the Department will be giving a considered response separately from this minute but I thought you might be interested in a few initial observations.
Spel 17
2. The Falklands and Hong Kong problems are, of course, completely different. Though, like the Falkland Islands, Hong Kong is a Dependent Territory whose sovereignty is claimed by another country, the similarity ends there. The Chinese have traditionally maintained that the Hong Kong situation is a legacy of history to be solved, when the time is ripe, by peaceful negotiation. (Interestingly this is the same line
they have instructed should be applied in their official propaganda about the Chinese attitude to the Falkland Islands case.) There have never been indications that the Chinese would seek a crude military solution to Hong Kong. As you know, its continued prosperity is important to them. Moreover, there are still 15 years to run before the Lease of the New Territories runs out in 1997.
3. It has been disconcerting, therefore, to see analogies drawn in the media and references to a 'Hong Kong type solution' being aired; these are not at all helpful. The news line taken on the Falkland Islands could have a difficult spin-off for us in the Hong Kong context. The new Governor is due to arrive in Hong Kong on 20 May. Even before the Falklands crisis the future of Hong Kong has been increasingly a topic of public speculation. On arrival he is likely to be thrown questions by the press with a Falkland Islands slant, for example, on whether the wishes of the
SECRET
/people