116
r of
ended when MacLennan was found dead. I would only repeat here that I find no evidence of Quinn or any me the SIU having harrassed, or in the popular term used by the press in early 1980 and by Mrs. Elliott, “hounded” MacLennan to death. I reject such claim.
146. In considering the actions taken by the three Officers most closely connected with these events, I have been greatly assisted by the evidence of Mr. Li Kwan-ha who was appointed by the Commissioner of Police to consider the procedures leading to MacLennan's arrest as well as any shortcomings in the investigating procedures adopted at the scene. Li is an experienced Police officer with many years experience in the CID and, at the time of giving his evidence, he was Deputy Director of the Criminal Investigation Department. I am appending a copy of Li's report to this Report (Appendix 35), because it represents a highly competent and painstaking reconstruction of the events to date together with an authoritative and fairminded statement of the shortcomings in the investigations. Li, in his evidence, did not resile from any of the matters contained in this Report. Subject to the qualifications which I will set out below, and after considering the evidence independently, I am in agreement with Li's findings.
(b) Trotman's actions on 14 January 1980
147.
148.
In his evidence, Li criticized Trotman in these terms:-
34
"Mr. Trotman related not only that MacLennan was required to be present on a specified time and date in his office, but also disclosed that someone from CID Headquarters would be interviewing him. And then when being asked by MacLennan, he further disclosed that it would be the SIU, specifically naming that Unit. To my observations, such disclosure would be unnecessary and unwise, Mr. Trotman could have been more circumspect in disclosing such information."
These observations were echoed by Clancy, the Director of Criminal Investigations, and Ross, the Chief Superintendent in charge of the group comprising the SIU. Johnston (who was Trotman's Commanding Officer at the time) would not judge Trotman, saying that he accepted that in these circumstances, it would be a matter for the discretion of the Formation Commander (namely, Trotman) and that in exercising this discretion, Johnston accepted that Trotman would have to weigh the requirements of the arrest party and the welfare of the junior officer subject to arrest.
149.
150.
Trotman, in his own defence, made the following points:-
(i) that it was a matter which Ross, when informing him that MacLennan was going to be arrested, did not
specifically discuss and therefore was left very much to his (Trotman's) discretion;
(ii) that there was no laid down procedure as to what was to be told to officers who would be interviewed by Units having an interest in them either with a view to bringing criminal proceedings or otherwise. His only guide was a procedure agreed between the Police and the ICAC and on which he was briefed by Moor, who was at one time District Police Commander Kowloon. By this briefing, Trotman had the impression that the officer going to be interviewed by the ICAC should be so informed, and he adopted the same principle in this
case;
(iii) that there were no guidelines extant at the time similar to the later written guidance notes issued by the Commissioner of Police: (1) one dated 18 March 1980 on ICAC/Police Liaison on the subject of arrest and interview of Police officers, (2) and a memorandum dated 30 September 1980, also from the Commissioner, in relation to arrest and charging procedures by the Complaints Against Police Office (CAPO); and that
(iv) the reason for telling MacLennan was borne out of concern for his junior officer's welfare.
In retrospect, Trotman conceded that had he known about MacLennan's involvement in what is now known as the Yuen Long Incident (which he did not), and had he known that MacLennan might kill himself (which he could not have anticipated), he would not have told MacLennan. However, in the circumstances, he felt justified to have told MacLennan what he did.
151. Before any judgment is passed on Trotman, it is only fair that I should state my views of him. Throughout the two and half days of his evidence, Trotman was direct, sincere, and completely truthful. He was certainly a very conscientious officer. He impressed me as a Commanding Officer who would undoubtedly put the welfare of his men at the forefront. Laudable though this attitude is, I cannot but agree with Li that Trotman was unwise in telling MacLennan what he did, though MacLennan of course appreciated Trotman's kindness. I accept that it was, particularly in the absence of clear-cut instructions, a matter of discretion for each Senior Officer as to what he should tell a Junior Officer in those circumstances, and clearly it was a matter in which the considerations of welfare of an individual officer and the considerations of the arrest party would have to be balanced. Trotman clearly knew that MacLennan was to be arrested. By telling MacLennan that he was going to be interviewed, he could do nothing but alert MacLennan to the fact that he would have to confront his accusers the following day. Therefore, I can only come to one conclusion, that Trotman, well
34
Li Kwan-ha Report, reproduced at Appendix 35.