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45.
Against this background, so far as homosexual crime is concerned, the primary target should be those who profit from homosexuality through procuring. These are important targets since triad connections, protection, and use of 'muscle' are all likely to be involved.
The second targets should be homosexuals who abuse young boys (say of the age of 18 and under) or other persons under mental or other disability—as opposed to indulging in homosexual activities—with consenting adults.
The third targets should be homosexuals against whom credible evidence emerges during other investigations; by credible evidence I mean the direct evidence of persons directly concerned or with personal knowledge of what occurred, as opposed to hearsay, gossip or mere suspicion.
Fourthly, if specific complaints of homosexual practices are made by members of the public to the Police, then of course they must be acted upon in the normal way.
In the investigations of the cases referred to above, I expect that leads pointing to practising homosexuals will be bound to crop up. Such leads should generally only be followed up either if they assist in the prosecution of a procurer, or if the abuse of young persons is suspected to have occurred. I consider in the context of the present situation with regard to crime in Hong Kong and the need to choose those areas of crime in which the limited police resources should be deployed, that it is not necessary to follow up suspicions of homosexuality unless they come within the criteria I have described above.
An exception to the above guidance in relation to consenting adults should be made in the case of credible 'leads' against either members of the Judiciary or of the Attorney General's Chambers or of other lawyers in active practice in the Courts or of the Police. Assuming such leads to be credible, then these should be followed up because it is unacceptable to have those charged with the enforcement of the law themselves to be deliberately breaking it. Each such lead must of course be individually assessed and common sense applied in judging its credibility. Hong Kong seems to breed rumours and wild allegations (as indeed has already been shown in some instances in Rockcorry itself) and it would cause unnecessary public alarm and be a waste of resources if every incredible allegation was pursued, or if allegations were further pursued once they were shown not to be credible.
It is I suppose possible that leads may appear pointing at very senior police officers or, similarly, members of my chambers. These should be reported to me personally at once and I will decide the manner in which the enquiries should proceed to do otherwise would place more junior police officers in a difficult and invidious position.
Lastly, it may be that credible leads appear pointing at senior members of the Government service. In deciding whether or not to pursue them, such cases must be considered on an individual basis, bearing in mind the position of the suspect in government and all the other circumstances.
I have appointed Mr. Neil Macdougall, the Assistant Director of Public Prosecutions and Mr. Warwick Reid, Senior Crown Counsel, to be available for consultation about any legal aspects of Operation Rockcorry where the police feel they need advice. I am also personally available should any matter arise where either yourself or the leader of the Rockcorry team feel it would be helpful to consult me. I would wish also to be kept informed of the general progress of the Rockcorry investigation, and told at an early stage of any leads which are being followed up and which point at senior members of the Government, the police, or the Judiciary.
With regard to Operation Rockcorry, I do not think a much larger deployment of Police manpower than that currently engaged is justified, although it may be that some temporary reinforcement in the form of either supervision or additional subordinate staff is necessary to dispose of the current enquiries. This of course is a matter for the Commissioner of Police.
I hope that Operation Rockcorry and the series of prosecutions resulting from it, including that of the prime target Molo Choy, and the continuation of operations along the lines and at the level of activity I have suggested above, should have a deterrent effect on the practice of homosexual crime in Hong Kong.
However, it is possible that evidence may emerge that the amount of homosexuality alleged to exist within the community and Government services is leading to corruption and blackmail in the present state of the law. In this case, we would have to consider either amending the law or deploying more Police manpower to decrease homosexuality. But in default of such evidence, and with Police resources stretched to deal with the upsurge in crime and illegal immigration, I do not think action in excess of that which I have outlined above is justified."
The Attorney General's letter represented the Terms of Reference for the SIU up to that time except for the paragraph relating to those charged with law enforcement.
46. The Charter was addressed to Mr. Henry and was kept by Mr. Moor. Moor showed it to Mr. Clancy. After the Government House meeting SIU activities were highlighted at Clancy's regular briefings with Moor. Clancy later briefed Ross and Quinn on its contents. The SIU was to continue their investigation of homosexual procurement and in addition was to pay attention to the possibilities of blackmail being involved, and all evidence on the part of Government servants being involved in homosexual activities was to be reported but the work of the Unit would be controlled at a high level. (Quinn in his evidence referred to "security risks" as one of the areas that came within the Terms of Reference of the SIU, Clancy however observed that security per se had nothing to do with the SIU, but any government officer who was involved in criminal matters, e.g. homosexual acts, could be regarded as a security risk to some extent. In my view Clancy must be correct on this.) In effect, the position was that when the Unit felt it had sufficient intelligence for it to consider prosecution, the relevant file was to be submitted to Clancy who would then take it to Moor. When deciding whether to target any individual, Moor would not necessarily always refer to all relevant written material but he would require documented evidence in relation to whoever was being investigated. Targetting was merely to ascertain whether or not there was any substance to the information the Police were in possession of, which were a long way from the matter being taken to the stage of prosecution.