CONFIDENTIAL
Chem
14
機密
34.
Assuming that ExCo, FCO and Chinese concurrence were obtained during the next three months and it was decided to follow the staffing plan at para 21(b), possible dates for the announcement would be mid-February or the end of July. Allowing for one week's warning and one month's stay, enforcement of the return of overstayers would then start either at the beginning of April 1982 or mid-September 1982. The field work would be carried out by the re- deployed staff using allocated pool vehicles. Police assistance might be sought to begin with so as to make the maximum initial impact.
35.
Although a mid-February announcement would allow the Chinese less time to change their minds and would result in action five months earlier, it would have two disadvantages. First, it would mean that Immigration staff would have to be withdrawn for the summer rush only two months after the oper- ation had begun; and secondly, it might not allow enough time to obtain Chinese concurrence, which is so vital and which might be slow in coming. On balance therefore, an announce- ment at the end of July would seem preferable.
Conclusion
36.
It would be practicable to plan and implement a scheme for returning overstayers to China. The main uncertainties and risks are the attitude of the Chinese authorities, and the degree of pressure which would build up within Hong Kong to allow increasing numbers of individual overstayers to remain on compassionate grounds. The first uncertainty can be resolved before our proposals are made known publicly. If the Chinese are unco-operative, then the scheme is stillborn. But only experience will show how strong the pressure inside Hong Kong will be. The final decision on whether or not to go ahead will have to rest on the best assessment of this which we can make. If we decided to proceed and later gave too much ground over allowing overstayers to remain, being gradually forced to deal with those from China as we deal with those from other countries, then the scheme would collapse, with consequent embarrassment and loss of confidence in the Government.
36.
The cost of implementation at $20 m.
a year is substantial. The cost of going on as we are is impossible to quantify but it too must be very considerable.
/37.
CONFIDENTIAL #
機密