GF 323
CONFIDENTIAL #2
機密
4
(vii)
review the policy after a suitable period and consider whether any increase in the number of visitors could be offered to the Chinese (paras 30 - 31).
ExCo and FCO Approval in Principle
11.
We should need to submit our proposals in some detail to both bodies to ensure that they appreciated the potential benefit and perceived the possible risks. ExCo would require some indication of the demands on resources (which would be substantial in terms of Immigration Department manpower and hence expenditure) and also of the very considerable benefits (though these are difficult to quantify). A forecast of public reaction would have to be provided. A ticklish point would be the difference in treatment between overstayers from China and those from elsewhere (see para 25). We would need to be sure that when the inevitable clamour arose over particular individuals or groups due for removal (as happened post CHAMPION), the Administration's policy would be fully supported. The existence of the appeals system would go some way to provide reassurance but Members would have to be prepared for numerous pleas for help from those facing removal. There would undoubtedly be petitions, meetings, groups outside Government House, press publicity, appeals to Britain etc., all amounting to very considerable, and possibly irrestible, pressure on the Government.
Approach to the Chinese
12.
The Chinese attitude is cardinal. It is moreover one part of the plan entirely outside our control.
13.
The Chinese could frustrate our plans by increasing the daily quota so as to allow for 150 settlers, plus visitors; by increasing the proportion of one-way permits (at worst, they could issue virtually all 150 permits as one- way documents); by granting two-way permits of inordinately long validity (i.e. one year or more); or by attempting to relieve some of the pressure by relaxing their counter measures against illegal emigration. Whatever we do therefore must have the concurrence of the Chinese and we must be reasonably sure that they will abide by their undertakings.
And we must bear in mind the pressure they are under from their own people.
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機密