CONFIDENTIAL
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In these circumstances the character of the CBDT category would have been altered, Hong Kong would appear more like second class citizens and, in the context of the political worries which I have described, would not be unreasonable in asking for reassurance.
'If reassurance is necessary, I suggest that we should use it to gain the maximum credit with Hong Kong and the other Dependent Territories. I see serious problems if we hold up an offer until we are forced into it by a Hong Kong amendment on British National. We would have to oppose that, and would appear to be grudging in offering a substitute. If, on the other hand, we make use of the Governor's considerable influence with the Unofficials in the Executive and Legislative Councils to explain why a 'British National' solution is politically impossible, and if we are seen to be taking the initiative in offering a reasonable concession at a fairly early stage (eg after a Falkland Islands amendment is carried in the Lords) we would lose nothing of substance and would gain considerably in relations with Hong Kong. I do not believe that the latter would renege on any understanding which was reached on the handling of amendments.
I am, however, sure that if we do not show ourselves ready to discuss the preference which Sir M MacLehose has already outlined to Mr Ridley, and to explain why it is not on, we run at the least the risk of embarrassing wire-crossing and very possibly of accusations of bad faith on our part.
'I hope therefore that Ministers can agree that action should go ahead on the lines of the recommendation.'
28 September 1981
Бир
R D Clift
Hong Kong and General Department
CONFIDENTIAL