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CONFIDENTIAL
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4. First, although provision for a station in Hong Kong or elsewhere in the Far East had been mentioned in the ideal
capital programme we had been discussing with the BBC, no decision had yet been taken about the money necessary to build it. In the absence of money, we had not undertaken a detailed assessment of the political pros and cons of establishing a station in Hong Kong; but we were now taking steps to do this, and were in touch with both the Governor
and our Ambassador in Peking. We needed to proceed with caution. This was not just a matter for the Hong Kong Government, but concerned our entire political relationship with China. There was also the point that the lease on the New Territories would be due to expire not long after the date foreseen in the ideal capital programme for completion of the station, Ministers would naturally be extremely reluctant to commit a large sum of money to a project which might in the end turn out to be a short-lived and wasteful investment. It was for this reason that, in our talks with Mr Muggeridge, we had always
been careful to speak about a relay station in Hong Kong or elsewhere in the Far East.
5. Sir Ian Trethowan accepted this. In addition to writing to the Secretary of State, his Chairman would also be writing to the Governor of Hong Kong to state the case as he saw it, for establishing a relay station there. Sir Ian admitted, in answer to my question, that Mr Howard's assessment of the attitude of the Hong Kong Government seemed very much more optimistic than anything the BBC had heard before. He thought it useful for these impressions to be aired with us, so that we could give our own views. I said that this was particularly necessary where China was concerned, as it was necessary to be sure that the Chinese to whom one spoke were people with real authority.
5 June 1981
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Lord N Gordon Lennox
CONFIDENTIAL