of competitive bids from the UK. Mr Stones' own view was
that the project was not at risk from any economic readjustment
for a variety of reasons.
Firstly, Quangdong Province's need
for electricity was critical and he felt that they were some 20-30,
000 MW short. That the project would be self-sufficient in foreign
exchange was crucial and the support of CLP in running the station
was considered a great asset by the Chinese. Mr Stones also
understood that the feasibility report was well regarded.
Mr Stones then went on to talk about some of the personalities
involved. He felt that the foremost important people in China
in the project were Mr Jin, Head of the Nuclear Department at the
Second Ministry of Machine Building, Mr Dang, Head of Nuclear Physics
Department, Madam Shi and Cheng Gang. He added that Lu Ying
was the administrative secretary to ål the Deputy Governors
in the Guangdong Provincial authority and as such, while obviously
well informed, did not have executive power.
Mr Stones noted that the feasibility report had been totally accepted
in Guangdong and, he believed, also approved in Peking.
The equipment chapter recommended three potential PWR suppliers,
Framatome, Westinghouse and KWU, though none of these were without
drawbacks; the Chinese were having problems with a French supplied
fertiliser plant which wasn't working particularly well,
able
KWU would only offer a turnkey contract which would be unacceptable
since technology transfer was an important part of the project
and Westinghouse was doubtful because of the question direction
of US muclear policy. Of the five potential turbine suppliers,
GELwas probably the least capable in Mr Stones view, having never
manufactured complete 900 MW high-speed turbine before. Another
factor mitigating against GEC was the CEGB's decision to have
2 x 660 M rather than a single 1300 MW unit for its own FWR