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One major uncertainty is the position of the French. In November
1980 (before the report was completed) President Giscard
d'Estaing appeared to have been given a commitment by the Chinese
that the first nuclear power station contract would be awarded to
France. In February 1981, Ministers therefore endorsed the view
that the best hope of UK involvement lay in collaboration
with the French but that the US option should be kept open. GEC
initiated discussions with the French nuclear supplier Framatome an
reached an agreement with them, but this has not yet been signed.
An Anglo/American partnership would probably have a greater UK
content than a UK/French bid, and would also enable the UK to
at participate in the fuel supply contract. But activing the US option
could lead to an all French bid and to the UK preference is there-
fore to wait until the Chinese have indicated their position.
There is as yet no indication from Peking that a decision on the
project is imminent, nor do we know which nuclear island supplier
might be favoured. UK tactics are to go for a negotiated bid
to try and preempt the possibility of the Chinese putting the
project out to international tender. In that event, our chances
of success might be lesser as we could not present a total package
offer.
The other problem which exists is the finaming of the station.
The Chinese will seek the best possible financial terms and agreeme
will be necessary between the UK and the preferred nuclear supplier.
Security will also be important.
The Chinese had been asked to
gaurantee the foreign loans but have pointed out that the project is supposed to be a joint venture with CLP (on a 60/40 basis) and hence