If the power companies are to purchase electricity from China, then the following points would require consideration:

(a)

the price which Hong Kong consumers would have to pay for the electricity;

(b)

having regard to the security of supply, the maximum szel bircite amount of electricity which Hong Kong could safely take onclave at let from China;« and p

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14

(c)

in the context of the proposed nuclear plant, the burÞ desirability of other Hong Kong parties being included on in the joint venture.

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As regards paragraph 13(a) above (the price which Hong Kong consumers would have to pay for electricity from China), there are two aspects of pricing which could give rise to public concern in Hong Kong. First, complaints would almost certainly be received if Hong Kong consumers had to pay more for electricity supplied from China than if the

electricity were generated in Hong Kong. Second, if Hong Kong consumers were to pay more than consumers in China for supplies from the same plant, criticism could be levelled that the former were apparently subsidising the latter. These points have been drawn to CLP's attention.

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As regards paragraph 13 (b) above (determination of the extent to which Hong Kong should allow itself to become dependent on China for the supply of electricity), the answer would seem to be for Hong Kong not to purchase more power than could be immediately made up from reserve capacity in the event of a disruption in the supply from China. In other words, unless reassured otherwise by reliable independent advice, the entire supply from China would be treated as if it were coming from one generating unit which, just as if it were in Hong Kong, would need to be backed by adequate spinning reserve and by adequate overall reserve for when it is out of commission for maintenance and so forth.

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ebaby inőtong »To apply this principle in the case of the proposed nuclear

project in Guangdong, it is necessary to consider the amount of reserve capacity that is likely to be available in Hong Kong in 1988 (probably the earliest date when the nuclear plant could commence supply). It will be difficult to forecast precisely what the overall reserve will be until the effects of interconnection have been assessed and a co-ordinated investment programme has been worked out and agreed by the two companies. But it is possible now to estimate what the spinning reserve will be. By 1988

Nato so CONFIDENTIAL

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