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there are no prior treaties in force, e.g. Montreux or Copenhagen, and no alternative high seas routes of similar convenience). Three areas around the UK fall into this category; the Straits of Dover, the North Channel between S. W. Scotland and N. Ireland and the Fair Isle Gap between the Orkneys and Shetlands. The question is whether we should apply the UNLOSC transit passage regime in those areas in advance of the UNLOSC Convention being signed and while we do not enjoy similar rights in other international straits, e.g. Gribraltar, Hormuz or Malacca. (Although many claims have been made to 12 mile territorial seas no state has yet taken measures to apply a transit passage type-regime in straits.) This point can only be settled after further discussion with the DOT, who favour application of a transit passage regime, and MOD, who for reasons connected with our nuclear submarine base at Faslane, do not. It may also be necessary to consult with the French about the Dover Straits and with the US especially about their submarine base at Holy Loch. But the attitude which we adopt as regards our own straits will be of importance in relation to other straits, since it will be difficult to claim one regime for Dover and another for Gibraltar, Hormuz or Malacca, especially once we have already extended the breadth of our own territorial sea to 12 miles.
3.
As regards dependent territories, details of the relevant cir- cumstances in relation to each territory are contained in the Annex to this Memorandum. Six categories emerge:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
Anguilla, Bermuda, Montserrat and Turks and Caicos Islands: an extension to 12 miles would present few difficulties if desired by local interests, although in some cases there would ultimately have to be a maritime delimitation with neighbours and there is a problem about the Bermuda baselines;
Pitcairn, BIOT and St Helena (including Ascension and Tristan da Cunha): an extension would present no difficulty, but may not be worthwhile;
British Virgin Islands: the situation is similar to that which obtains in other Caribbean territories, but US reactions need to be taken into account because of the close links with the US Virgin Islands;
Cyprus SBAS, Gibraltar and Hong Kong: the possibilities of extension are limited by the importance of maintaining good relations with neighbouring countries. In addition, an extension at Gibraltar could cause problems in relation to our policy as regards UK Straits (e.g. the US might press for full transit passage rights at Gibraltar, which we would not necessarily wish to grant in UK straits);
Falkland Islands and BAT: special consideration required because of related disputes;
Belize, Antigua and Brunei: probably do not need to be considered.
/St. Kitts/Nevis
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St Kitts/Nevis is normally not made the subject of extensions of UK legislation and as an Associated State should be considered separately.
4.
It is not possible to decide how to deal with areas which might be considered as international straits adjacent to dependent territories until our policy on straits for the UK itself has been decided. There are no problems with straits in relation to Bermuda, the Cyprus SBAS, BIOT, Pitcairn, Turks and Caicos and St Helena. Anguilla, BAT, Montserrat and St Kitts/Nevis have adjacent straits which might be considered eligible for transit passage rights. Gibraltar, as explained above, poses a major problem as regards straits.
5.
While there is no obligation to extend the territorial sea in dependent territories and in no case would we wish any dependent territories to extend before the UK, it will be necessary to have a public explanation for any non-extensions once the UK extension has taken place. It would be preferable to avoid having to state explicitly that any dependent territory has been prevented from extending because of current disputes e.g. with its neighbours. But it should be possible to deal with such questions by saying that the matter remains under consideration without giving any commitment that a favourable conclusion will be reached.
6.
It is relevant that the practical benefits of extending the territorial sea in the case of dependent territories is unlikely to be large.
It would not affect claims to continental shelves (and the oil reserves thereof) which are already recognised as extending beyond the territorial sea. Nor would it significantly affect fisheries since the limit for most territories is already more than 12 miles. But it would increase the area in which the enforcement of pollution, customs, immigration and drug smuggling legislation can be applied and dependent territories may argue that if the UK and many other countries have 12 mile limits, they should be allowed to do so too.
7.
It is probable that the extension will be applied to the Isle of Man (which has already expressed interest in a 12 mile territorial sea) and to the Channel Islands. Steps will be taken to make sure that the extension off Northern Ireland does not cause problems with the Republic which has claimed territorial waters of 3 miles breadth all round Ireland.
8.
In relation to the CFP, it will be necessary to consider whether we should enter into consultations with our Community partners if we alter the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea will be measured (para. 1(iii) above). It would be preferable to leave this until the main elements of the CFP have been settled. It is in any case unnecessary to make any move until it is clear when and how the baselines would be changed. (The changing of the baselines would in a few places have the effect of denying to foreign vessels small areas where they at present enjoy fishing access).
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ANNEX
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NOTES ON INDIVIDUAL TERRITORIES AND STATES
A. DEPENDENT TERRITORIES
Anguilla:
Belize:
Bermuda:
BAT:
BIOT:
BVI:
Delimitation with St Martin (France). Strait adjacent to island. No difficulty in extension; status of strait needs consideration.
Its territorial sea and the strait leading to Guatemala are already under debate in the negotiations with the latter; according to present plans, Belize will be independent before the legislation is introduced.
No delimitation questions; no international straits. Some controversial baselines on the north. No difficulty in extension, apart from the question of baselines.
Delimitation with Norway and the (overlapping) Chilean claim. Straits between islands. Extension could lead to argument in Antarctic forum.
No delimitation. Straits within islands, but equally convenient high seas routes exist.
Delimitation with US VI. Straits between islands and between BVI and US VI. Main passage through chain lies within US VI. Close economic relationship with US VI means that BVI may not wish to extend if US reaction to UK extension is strong.
Cayman Islands: No delimitations. Straits within islands, but there are
equally convenient high seas routes.
Cyprus SBAS:
Falkland Islands
S. Georgia S. Sandwich
Islands
Delimitation with the Republic of Cyprus is defined in the Treaty of Establishment. It would only allow a narrow belt of extension off Dhekelia. Cyprus has a 12 mile territorial sea, but Turkey, which has a 6 mile territorial sea, is contesting the right of Greece, which also has a 6 mile limit, to extend to 12 miles in the Aegean. Relations with Cyprus may need to be con- sidered. Extension might raise the question of fisheries and may not be worthwhile.
No delimitations. Straits within islands, but there are equally convenient high seas routes. Possible Argentine objections (Argentine claims a 200 mile territorial sea) and pressure by islanders to extend.
/Gibraltar
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