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DSR 11C
almost certainly involve the concession of recognition of
Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong and thus a major change
in its status that would have to be reflected in UK law.
12. Although some warning signs could appear at an early
stage, confidence within and towards Hong Kong could slip
is the time goes by the threat to the territory's economic very quickly If we judged that there was a genuine threat
and political viability use grows and we
to the Territory's economic and political viability we would
need to calculate very carefully when to approach the
positive
Chinese Government for urgent discussions
too early and
they might not find the symptoms convincing; too late and
the harm might be irreparable. It will almost certainly need to be [made]
at a very high level as only the top
leadership could contemplate a change of policy towards
Hong Kong. The best tactic might be a personal message
from the Prime Minister or Secretary of State delivered
in Peking and/or in London. Its content should probably
not be detailed, and certainly not offer a definitive
solution which the Chinese might feel compelled to shoot
down. Any subsequent discussions should be as simple as
possible. It would be very difficult to obtain Chinese
agreement to any complex formula in time to halt the slide
in confidence.
13. Both in monitoring Hong Kong and Chinese opinion, and
even, in certain circumstances, in discussing solution,
the option of using non-official intermediaries with Peking
needs to be borne in mind. There are a number of potential
'messengers' mainly senior Hong Kong Chinese businessmen
with close contacts in Peking, who might be used. But in
so delicate a matter the question of control is very
important. A message loosely delivered could give a
totally false impression and defeat its own object. Probably
therefore, such intermediaries should only be used, and that
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