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Moreover, I see problems in saying that there is no question of British administration continuing in the rest of Hong Kong if it ceases in the New Territories (paragraphs 3 and 5 of Hong Kong Telegram 1098). In the first place, no British Ministerial decision has been taken on such an important point (which implies relinquish- ment of sovereignty over Hong Kong Island and Kowloon). In the second place the statement could be read by the Chinese as an implied threat by the British to get out of Hong Kong if the Chinese did not meet our requirements. We know that they suspect us of wanting this. We would get nowhere by confirming their suspicions.
6. I see difficulties also in the LPS mentioning examples of the options in the background paper (paragraph 8 of Hong Kong Telegram No 1098). We are unlikely to have endorsement of these proposals by the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister by the time of Mr Atkins' visit and there is a risk that specific proposals would produce a premature rejection which would inhibit later negotiation.
7.
While I think that the other substantive proposals made by the Governor are acceptable, I suggest that we need to prune his proposed talking points considerably and to adopt a different procedure. Essentially I recommend that the LPS should speak on the lines of the attached re-drafted brief. This includes a passage, making a number of the Governor's points, for use if Chinese leaders are reasonably forthcoming. In addition, I suggest that Mr Donald should have the other points ready for use if appropriate, with Chinese
officials in subsequent discussion. He could at the same time mention possible options, such as 15 years' notice, not as formal British proposals but as ideas which had already appeared in the Press. I do not think that any paper with our ideas should be handed to the Chinese at this stage.
8.
I believe that this procedure would best achieve the aim of the LPS keeping the subject in the Chinese mind while not closing options for the Prime Minister. It would avoid putting proposals to them at a high level which would risk a premature rejection.
9 December 1981
25
Zir
R D Clift
Hong Kong and General Department
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Sir E Youde
Mr Donald
Mr Elliott, FED
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