PS/LPS
SECRET
HKR
DERESE PER TEENS TY
น
Land Puy Seat (6)
Риз бол
04011
RELLIVAN M ALOISY NO
14 DEC 1981
DESK UPRU
INDEX
A,
259
(عمان
265
FUTURE OF HONG KONG
1.
AGO 17/12
The LPS is holding a meeting tomorrow morning to have a preliminary discussion on the submission of 3 December on this subject. He may also wish to consider the line which he should take during his visit to China at the beginning of January.
2.
at the beginning of January.
the
Sec/269
FCO Telegrams Nos 924 and 925 to Hong Kong put a draft line to Hong Kong and Peking. The Governor has replied (Hong Kong Telegram No 1098). Although the Ambassador has not yet replied, it might be helpful to comment on Sir M MacLehose's suggestions.
3.
The first sentence of Hong Kong Telegram No 1098 jumps the gun in assuming a decision on the line to take during the Prime Minister's visit. We would agree with the Governor that other things being equal it would be better to wait until the Chinese are more aware of the pressure of the future problem. However,
if the Prime Minister's visit comes off, this will inevitably introduce a new element and raise expectations of an early solution. This is all that the draft in FCO Telegram No 925 was intended to cover. But whatever line appears most appropriate for Mrs Thatcher to take in September, we must work on the assumption that she cannot avoid the issue.
4.
(25g that
265
It would not be practicable either for the LPS to avoid the subject in January. If a Cabinet Minister did not raise it, it would give the impression that we were losing interest in the points expressed by the Secretary of State last April. But I do not think that the Governor is right in concluding that Mr Atkins should there- fore go into considerable detail on the nature of the legal problem and the sort of solution which we have in mind. There is nothing wrong with the summary in paragraph 3 of Hong Kong Telegram No 1098. It sets out our dilemma admirably.
Many of the points would help in educating the Chinese if introduced at a lower level.
But the main problem is that there is too much emphasis on the ending of British administration in the New Territories in 1997, and by implication on the need for a continuation of that administration. As my submission of 3 December pointed out, this is in fact what we would like to achieve. But it is also very difficult for the Chinese to concede and we must approach it gradually. The main reason why the Chinese rejected our suggestions in 1979 was almost certainly because they did not want to endorse British legislation extending beyond 1997. If a senior Minister were to speak on the lines suggested by the Governor, the Chinese leader concerned might feel himself obliged to take a negative position.
SECRET
/5.