CODE 18-77
Mr Williamson
НКИ
Reference.
SECRET
ли
8.20.60
210
이
Pro 6/1
211
206
FUTURE OF HONG KONG
1.
Mr Rushford's minute of 15 October and yours of 20 October. These are very useful contributions to the discussion. I certainly agree that we should consider the alternative approaches which Mr Rushford suggests when we submit to Ministers. I have no objection to his putting his minute to Mr Steel for his preliminary views. This should, of course, be done while making clear that no decisions have been taken by Ministers.
2.
My own preliminary view is as follows. While I have some sympathy for the line that the Chinese are likely to be extremely unforthcoming if left to themselves and that we do risk a rapid and uncontrollable slide of confidence if we do nothing, it is not in practice possible to deal with the matter unilaterally. As Mr Rushford himself makes clear, we would have to give the Chinese advance notice of our intention. That is the rub. I am more sceptical than you or Mr Rushford that they would react favourably to the legislative options which he outlines. The main problem is that to do any good we would want them to be prepared to confirm in answer to questions that they accepted our action or at the very least not to deny a public statement on our part, in Parliament or elsewhere, that we had consulted them and were confident that they would agree. As Mr Rushford rightly points
out, in 1979 the Chinese baulked at the idea of endorsing the continuance of British administration after 1997. I am afraid that they would feel that they were again being asked to do much the same.
3.
Let us nevertheless by all means give the idea a run. I certainly think we should be able to make use of Mr Rushford's options or a combination of them when we do assess that the Chinese are ready to talk.
Please give Mr Davies a copy of this series of minuting and seek his comments.
4.
B
21 October 1981
R D Clift
SECRET