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DSR 11C
B)
C)
(iii) Effect. At best temporary.
Such encouragement
and assurances would cause some: local Chinese investors
to maintain investments. Little effect on foreign investors unless coupled with action on land leases.
Not sufficient to halt a serious slide of confidence for long, if at all, because unsupported by either firm and 'bankable' description of conditions under Chinese law,
assurance of continuance of British jurisdiction.
Declaration by the Chinese that, because treaties unequal,
Hong Kong would revert to China when
1997 irrelevant;
the time was ripe.
(i) Likelihood.
if as a formal statement a slight but
More
significant change in present Chinese position.
difficult than (A) for Chinese however as it implies
continuing British administration beyond 1997. Becomes
progressively more difficult for them the more that is
said about time not being ripe for many years to come.
(ii) Problems for HMG. None: the Chinese already
claim sovereignty. A statement from them that the lease
should be ignored would however open the way for us to take legal measures that would align the practical
reality in Hong Kong with Chinese stated views.
(iii) Effect.
Would be too vague to have significant
effect, even if coupled with (A) above, unless coupled
with agreement to action by HMG to take continuing
powers of administration beyond 1997.
Joint or parallel statements by Chinese and HMG that
treaties no longer applicable; Hong Kong Chinese
territory temporarily under British administration.
Likelihood. Not easy, as it requires public
approval by the Chinese of British administration.
(i)
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