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9
DSR 11C
of the limit in the 1898 Order in Council to our administration
in the New Territories beyond 1997. These three would almost
certainly involve the concession of recognition of Chinese
sovereignty over Hong Kong and thus a change in its status
that would have to be reflected in UK law.
12.
Although some warning signs could appear at an early
stage, confidence within and towards Hong Kong could slip
very quickly. Constant monitoring of business and public
opinion will be necessary both by the Hong Kong Government
and by HMG in its contacts with overseas investors. But
this cannot be an overt exercise, since knowledge of it could
in its turn start a scare.
13.
If we judged that there was a genuine threat to the
Territory's economic and political viability we would need
to calculate very carefully when to approach the Chinese
Government for urgent discussions
not find the symptoms convincing;
be irreparable.
—
too early and they might
too late and the harm might
It will almost certainly need to be made
at a very high level (Deng Xiaoping or possibly Party Chairman
Hu Yaobang or Premier Zhao Ziyang) as only the top leadership
could contemplate a change of policy towards Hong Kong. The
best tactic might be a personal message from the Prime
Minister or Secretary of State delivered in Peking and/or in
London. Its content should probably not be detailed, and
certainly not offer a definitive solution which the Chinese
might feel compelled to shoot down. Any subsequent
discussions should be as simple as possible. It would be
very difficult to obtain Chinese agreement to any complex
formula in time to halt the slide in confidence.
down./
14. Both in monitoring Hong Kong and Chinese opinion, and
even, in certain circumstances, in discussing solution, the
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