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DSR 11C
(ii)
Problems for HMG. None: the Chinese already claim
sovereignty. A statement from them that the lease
should be ignored would however open the way for us to
get their agreement to legal measures that would align
the practical reality in Hong Kong with Chinese stated
views.
(iii) Effect.
Would be too vague to have significant
effect, even if coupled with (A) above, unless coupled
with agreement to action by HMG to take continuing powers
of administration beyond 1997.
(i)
C) Joint or parallel statements by Chinese and HMG that
treaties no longer applicable; Hong Kong Chinese
territory temporarily under British administration
Likelihood. Not easy, as it requires public
approval by the Chinese of British administration.
Nevertheless, generally accords with their present
tacit position, and involves significant public
renunciation by HMG. (ii) Problems for HMG.
Recognition of Chinese sovereignty
over Hong Kong requires an Act of Parliament divesting UK
of sovereignty. Implications of abrogation. Legal
status of Hong Kong, particularly in international
agreements, would need to be clarified. Need for
legislation on land leases and continuing powers of
administration which would have to be of indeterminate
(Automatically renewable periodic leases
length.
possible.)
Might be coupled with demand for use of
Chinese flag (cf. stated policy towards Taiwan).
(iii) Effect. Impact would depend on assumptions about
how long the arrangement was expected to last. Initial
effect might be to produce uncertainty, unless Chinese
made it clear that they expected the arrangement to last
at least 15 years. But confidence would grow over time,
as it would be up to the Chinese to foster it if they
wished their benefits from Hong Kong to continue.
should eventually produce a Macao-like reliance on
provided the Chinese acquiesced in
traditional tenure
www.
changes in British law which made this possible.
It