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DSR 11C
Order in Council to our administration in the New Territories
beyond 1997.
These three would almost certainly involve
the concession of recognition of Chinese sovereignty over
Hong Kong and thus a change in its status that would have
to be reflected in UK law.
10. Although some warning signs could appear at an early
stage, confidence within and towards Hong Kong could slip
very quickly.
Constant monitoring os business and public
opinion will be necessary both by the Hong Kong Government
and by HMG in its contacts with overseas investors. But
this cannot be an overt exercise, since knowledge of it
could in its turn start a scare.
11. If we judged that there was a genuine threat to the
Territory's economic and political viability we would need
to calculate very carefully when to approach the Chinese
If this were done too early the Chinese might
well not find the symptoms of sliding confidence convincing
and turn us down. Too late and the harm might be
Government.
irreparable.
Through the Embassy in Peking and the New
China News Agency in Hong Kong we may be able to gauge
Chinese reactions to events in Hong Kong. When it becomes
clear that an approach must be made, the level of contact
will be critical. It will almost certainly need to be made
at a very high level. A change of policy towards Hong Kong
could only be contemplated by the top leadership in Peking,
at present Deng Xiaoping and possibly the Party Chairman
Hu Yaobang or Premier Zhao Ziyang. Possible methods of
approach could include a written message from the Prime
Minister or the Secretary of State. If the timing allowed
this might be delivered personally, during a Ministerial
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