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DSR 11C
D)
(i)
Likelihood.
About same for the Chinese as (D),
but might be easier because there is no time limit,
and it generally accords with present Chinese position,
and involves a public renunication by HMG.
(ii) Problems for HMG. Recognition of Chinese sovereignty
over Hong Kong requires an Act of Parliament divesting UK
of sovereignty. Implications of abrogation. Legal
status of Hong Kong, particularly in international
agreements, would need to be clarified. Need for
i
legislation on land leases and continuing powers of
administration which would have to be of indeterminate
length. (Automatically renewable periodic leases
possible.) Might be coupled with demand for use of
Chinese flag (cf. stated policy towards Taiwan).
(iii) Effect. Impact would depend on assumptions about
how long the arrangement was expected to last. Initial
effect might be to produce uncertainty, unless Chinese
made it clear that they expected the arrangement to last
at least 15 years. But confidence would grow over time,
as it would be up to the Chinese to foster it if they
wished their benefits from Hong Kong to continue.
should eventually produce a Macau-like reliance on
traditional tenure - provided the Chinese acquiesced in
changes in British law which made this possible.
Declaration by the Chinese that change would only occur
with adequate warning; this defined as 15 years
(i) Likelihood. Difficult for Chinese to tie
themselves to a specific period. Becomes harder if
selected period stretches beyond 1997. But Zhou Enlai
did say to Sir Alec Douglas-Home in 1972 that Chinese
It
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