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DSR 11C
executive functions. Would mean formalisation of
NCNA First Director's role. No serious problem for
us but Chinese would be unlikely to give concrete
guarantees in return.
e) Chinese participation in administration.
This could
range from a simple right of consultation by the
Chinese Representative through membership of EXCO/LEGCO
to some say in the appointment of the Governor. The
former might be workable but any type of joint
administration or Chinese government by proxy would
create intolerable problems for HMG and would itself
damage confidence in Hong Kong.
Conclusions
5.
a) Substance of agreement. Our first aim should be an
agreement on a sufficient period of notice [say at
least 15 years] for the termination of British
Administration.
In return we should try to limit
ourselves to an acknowledgement of the Chinese
position on sovereignty but be prepared to
recognise residual or even actual Chinese sovereingty
in return for progressively stronger guarantees.
Any agreement must involve Chinese acquiesence in
whatever measures were necessary to preserve the legal
basis for British Administration. Could agree to
Chinese Representative with minimal rights of
consultation but not to joint administration.
b) Form of Agremeent. Formal Treaty unlikely.
Confidential understanding with associated public
statements or actions more probable.
A
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