6. AS I SEE IT, OPTION D WOULD NOT BE ABOUT THE SAME FOR THE CHINESE AS C BUT MUCH EASIER, SINCE THEY WOULD HAVE OUR PUBLIC ACCEANCE THAT HONG KONG IS CHINESE TERRITORY TEMPORARILY UNDER OUR ADMINISTRATION.
7. OPTION E MIGHT NOT PROVE SO UNP ALATABLE TO THE CHINESE, PARTICULARLY IF COUPLED WITH A CONCESSION ON SOVEREIGNTY. IT HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF REQUIRING THEM TO DO VERY LITTLE. THE DIFFICULTY IS THAT IT WOULD NOT APPARENTLY BE SUFFICIENT TO HALT A SLIDE IN CONFIDENCE.
8. OPTION F AS PRESENTED IS NOT, I THINK, A STARTER. BUT IT DOES HAVE THE ADVANTAGE FROM THE CHINESE POINT OF VIEW THAT ANY FORMAL DECLARATION AND LEGAL ACTION IN RELATION TO THE TREATIES WOULD BE TAKEN UNILATERALLY BY US, THUS ENABLING THEM TO MAINTAIN THEIR FORMAL POSITION OF NON-ACCEPTANCE OF THE TREATIES. I SHOULD NOT ENTIRELY RULE IT OUT IF IT WERE COUPLED WITH A FORMAL DECLARATION BY THE UK RECOGNISING CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WHOLE TERRITORY, AND THE TEMPORARY NATURE OF BRITISH ADMINISTRATION. THIS APPROACHES OPTION D, BUT WITHOUT THE JOINT
DECLARATION. PRESUMABLY TO BE EFFECTIVE SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY REASONABLY OBVIOUS ACQUIESCENCE ON NZE CHINESE PART, AND SOME KIND OF QUOTABLE ASSURANCE ON NO SUDDEN CHANGE IN THE STATUS.
9. THE PRESENT PARAGRAPH 9 MIGHT BE RE-WORDED TO BRING OUT THE POINT THAT OPTIONS A, B AND E ARE NOT ENOUGH MOR US, OPTION F, EXCEPT IN THE MODIFIED FORM SUGGESTED ABOVE, WOULD BE TOO MUCH FOR THE CHINESE. C, D, OR MODIFIED F THEREFORE SEEM TO BE THE MOST LIKELY POSSIBILITIES, IN DESCENDING ORDER OF ATTRACTIVENESS FROM THE UK POINT OF VIEW.
10. THE SUGGESTION IN PARAGRAPH 10 THAT WE COULD GET AWAY WITHOUT A CONCESSION ON SOVEREIGNTY MAY BE MISLEADING. OTHER POSSIBLE DEMANDS ARE NOT IN THE SAME CATEGORY. WE SHOULD WORK ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT IF THE CHINESE ARE TO GIVE US THE ASSURANCE NEEDED TO RALLY CONFIDENCE THEY WILL REQUIRE AT LEAST THE MAJOR POLITICAL CONCESSION ON SOVEREIGNTY IN RETURN. PRESUMABLY IT WILL BE THE OBJECT OF THE PAPER TO BRING THIS OUT.
CRADOCK
ཡུམ་འབ་=་-ས་མ-ག== .;