660
ET MON
Mr. Friar
SECRET AND PERSON AL
〃 HKK. OYD Roglift (HY (3)
Sir Edward Youde KCMG MBE
FCO
Lecas Jeddy,
бесен
THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG
Autec FED Mi Mihaven Per Dardet.
521/4
BRITISH EMBASSY,
PEKING.
13 April 1981
1. You asked for my views on the implications of Deng's remarks on this subject to Lord Carrington on 3 April. You have already had a reporting telegram on the subject but I now enclose the record of the conversation, which is fuller in one or two respects.
906
See
120
2. The first and obvious point is that Deng was very reserved and unwilling to say more on the subject than he had already done. The previous day Huang Hua had twice invited specific proposals from our side; Deng did not follow this up.
He gave some examples to support his words but no more. Unlike Deng on many other occasions and issues, he seemed like a man who was constrained by an agreed brief.
3. His examples, Taiwan and Tibet, can be interpreted variously. It is, however, clear that Hong Kong is closely linked to Taiwan in Chinese minds (see Deng's remark "when Britain considered the question it should study China's policies towards Taiwan") and that China will do nothing in respect of Hong Kong that could cut across the larger enterprise of the recovery of Taiwan. Deng's proposed conditions for solution of the Taiwan issue are in some ways reassuring if applied to Hong Kong: the reference to an unchanged way of life and political set-up could point to a continuing large degree of British administration; nevertheless it is clear from what he said that these concessions would have to be within the framework of a recognition of Chinese sovereignty.
4. Tibet is again a case of diversity within the recognition of Chinese overall control, though it was no doubt also meant as an example of how China keeps her word unless local leaders attempt to take unilateral action (the Dalai Lama's flight).
5. Neither of these examples quite bites on the case of a territory with a terminal date, where unless something is done confidence will slide and where later a lease will fall in. Nor was there any recognition in the talk of the immediate problem exercising us, that of confidence. Deng's remarks were all about Chinese broadmindedness and Chinese reliability. It is possible that despite the various high-level messages
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SECRET AND PERSONAL
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